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PREFACE 
This thesis is concerned with a very specif'ic proble11: 
the relation between Bartra's atheism and his description of 
relations vlith the Other. Yet such a formal lh1i ta tion may 
perhaps obscure tlle concrete dimensions of the problem. The 
problem. of. God is not. only le.1•ger than its place in the sar-
trean frar.1er.:o:rl::. It overflm;s the bounds of philosophy, of 
life itself, spilling over the edge of life knovJn as death. 
This is to say that the problezn. of God may be a problem at 
the core of life it self. l!Ian b1 s becor::e the creature that 
battles 1·:ith God. 
To consider the problem of God 1d thin certain fornal 
limitations is a necessary stricture, but necessary in the 
way that events are necesrc:ary to a whole life. 4:L.fl event bri!l3S 
into focus the developnent of a lifetime at a certain mor.:ent. 
The event is proceeded by a dialectic of previous events and 
will also be follor:ed by nore. Even the .LllOm.en t of the event 
is only an abstraction, for it is not self-contained. It has 
entru1elemonts in the past in some a::eLtS; it other areas it has 
2 
already li10Vecl bey·ond itself into the future. This event, this 
thesis, exists v;i th these character i sties. / 
As an event, moreov0r, it .bas an undeniable personal char-
actor. .Althouc:h it focuses on a particular problem, it is only 
constituted as such Vii thin rn.y ovm consciousness. This means 
that even the e:x:pository sections of this v:ork will reflect 
the viewpoint of the au thor, although these \'Jill be r:.ade ex-
plicit whenever possible. 
Finally, the character of this particular thesis is to be 
noted. It deals v!i th the pro blen: of God, a problem fund.az:.ental 
enough to define man. The funda.::e ntal character· of this the sis 
as an event, the fact that- it is concerned with a probler1 co:Jrrton 
to nan as a whole, reveals its public dimensions. Although it 
happens within m'J mm development and is VJritten fron my own 
viewpoint, the dimensions of the problem e:t~tend to all Elen. 
VJha t at first a.1•11ears to be a private consideration takes on 
public ditJ.ensions because it deals with an event V·ihich is by 
its m.ture cor.Jinon to .many !Len. 
This thesis then is <.:m event, one vllich considers 2, most 
fundaL:.ental probl~, v1hich is by nature public, fror.1 a particular 
. . t . . . . . t 1~" . fl v~ewpo~n Vilncn ~s ~ se :L J.n ux. 
Before turning to the problen: it self, I should like to 
gratefully acl:nov:ledge the assistance and encourageL:e nt of Rev. 
Janes J. Dagennis, whose un<lerstandinz; and :;:atience allovJed 
this thesis to be cone '\?hat it is. 
/ 
IHTRODUC':PION 
Our center, gl"'andfather,. the center \·:hich swept the 
visible \'.0 rld into its v;hirl and fought to elevate it 
to the upper level of vclor and responsibility, was 
the battle ·with God. Which God? The fierce suF.;rait of 
man's soul, the sumr"1it ·which v:e are ceaselessly about 
to attain and Vihich ceaselessly jur.:ps to its feet and 
climbs still higher. nnoes man do battle with God ?tt 
some acquaintances asked re sarcastically one dc..y. I 
answered them, "With whom else d'i you expect hiLl to do 
battle?" Truly, vdth whom else? 
-Nikos Y~zantze.kis 
E::dstentialism is not only an atheism in the sense that 
it would fP to great lengths to demonr~trate that God does 
not exist. It declares more: even if God Vlould exist, 
that ·would change nothing: this is our pointof viev;. 
Not that \Ve VJould believe that God e:dsts, but we think 
that the problem. is not one of his existence; it is 
necessary that r:.an find hinself and convince him.self' that 
nothing can save him. from himself, even a viable proof 
of tb.e existence of God .2 
--Jean-Paul Sartre 
Even to the casual observer, it becor.:es evident that the 
t·wentieth century m..<:tn does not know quite Vihat to do about God. 
lnikos Kazantzakis, Report to Greco, trans. P. A. Bien 
(Ne1.J York: Banta.c. Bool~s, 19'66), pp. 477-78. 
2Jean-Paul Sartre, L 'ExistentialisrJ.e est un hum.anisme 
(Paris: Editions Nagel, 196o), :p;95. Author is transliibion. 
2 
The ::;,ubject of countless affirmations, contradictions, and neea-
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tions, God has rer'1B.i ned a central issue in contemporary thought, 
whether through his presence or absence. Susan .il.nir:la Taubes has 
caught tb.e spirit of this absence of God q_uite ·well. 
Atheisra, Vlhich used. to be a charge leveled against skep-
tics, unbelievers, or simply the indifferent, has come 
to mean a relir~ous ex_perience of the death of God. The 
godlessnessor t!ievwrld in all its strata and categories 
becones, paradoxically and by a dialectic of negation, the 
signature of God and yields a ~stical atheism, a theology 
of divine absence and nonbeing, of divine im.:potence, divine 
nonintervation, and eli vine indifference .3 
It is to this paradoxical presence that both the authors cited 
above are oonsidering. Yet t..h.at which Kazantzakis sees as the 
challenge to man is what Sartre rejects as irrelevant. 
It is the purpose of this thesis to clarify, through an 
analysis of the many releve.nt texts,' the precise attituc1e to\vard 
God found in tr..e philosophy of Jefu"1-I'aul Sartre o This ·will be 
accompllshed by first considering these factors in the back-
ground of Jean-Paul Sartre v;hich would affect his position on 
God. This will be followed by a detailed consideration of his 
statements on matters concerned v1i th religious experience. 
Then Sartre 's more specifically ontoloc;ical stand on the non-
existence of God viill be analyzed. In the last chapter of the 
first part the probleu. of God and history in Sart,re will be 
3susan .Anima Taubes, "The Absent God " Journal o:f Religion, 
(January, 1955), p. 6. Italics in ~rigi'nal. 
3 
presented. 
In the second part o:r this thesis Sartre 's atp.ei an will 
be criticized in tenn.s of his doctrine of our relations with 
( 
the Other. This will begin vd th an explication o:r his idea 
of the Other, his modes of presence and knowledge o:r his exis-
tence. This will be :rollmved by a consideration of the exper-
ience of God as Other and the viability o:r this within the 
Sartrean :framework. A detailed consideration o:r this idea o:r 
God. as Other as :round in Sartre's The Words vJill conclude this 
part. 
The third and final part o:r this thesis contains a series 
o:r reflections on the valu~ of this idea of God as Other and 
its shortcomings. It asl~s, i:r indeed it is God with ·whom man 
does battle, does Sartre 's framework o:ffer a viable and valuable 
way of talking about the problem o:r God toda~r J:or theists as 
well as atheists? 
F ART I • THE ATIIEIS:M O:b, 
JEiui-FAUL S .. lliTRE 
/ 
/ 
C1L!U?TER I 
THE SHii.PING OF Tlill PROBT.'f%I 
The Sartirean Mllieu 
Without doubt, Sartre is the product of his age. Born on 
June 21, 1905, he was raised in a bourgeois l!lilieu. Baptized 
as an infant, he lost his faith at the early age of eleven. 
At the university he \'Jas first of all interested in psychology 
and psychiatry, without l_osing any interest either in litera-
ture or philosophy. 1\.fter his enprisonment during the war, he 
collabor·o.ted with the Resistence and then began his political 
v;ri tines. In 1945 he founded Les Ter1ps modernes. 4 
Within the context of his age, there are a nTh"TT.ber of fac-
tors against which Sartre reacted. :&"'r. Emile Rideau disti.n-
guishes five of these vJhich are of interest here. I shall con-
sider each in turn. 
Idealism.-The philosophy of idealis.Pl, which issues from 
Descartes and ul tiltilltely the Greeks, reflects on the objective 
world of science, of abstract knO">'Jledge, o:f essences and clear 
and distinct ideas. nThis idealism is a dualism, Vlhich separates 
41tor a chrono.Lo.sical list of Sartre 's rra jor publications, 
see Appendix I. 
entirely the body and the soul, matter and spirit, world and 
man.n5 Although sart1"'e tried to escape this duali?ffi,6 there 
is some doubt as to the degree or success he achieved.? 
Technolo&.-Sartre, moreover, reacts against the world 
6 
or the technical, "the Vlorld 'Where rn.an objectifies himself by 
·work, but risks losing himselr in it ."8 
Confomisa.-Present hand-in-he.nd with technology, the 
world of rocial organization appears as one ·which smothers 
liberty in ir11_perso nal conformiSJ."tl and ·whicl1 imposes precise 
runctions on man. It is in the face of this that sartre is 
compe·lled to assert the absolute freedom of consciousness. 
Opt_im.ism .-The great· optim.isn of the conterilporary world 
revealed itself to Sartre as a fai~~ in the progress of man 
and history, presuming that they are d:irected by infallible 
rational aethods. Sartre, during his visit to .A ... "11erica, vms 
5Jl.kuile Rideau, "Un humani sme social a thee: Jean- Paul sa.rtre 
et le christianisme, n Nouvelle Revue Theologique, L:O: .... w, no 10 
(1963) , p. 1041. Aut.~ or 1 s t'rmisiat1.on. 
6An ~xcellent example of this is to be :round in Sartre's 
chapter on "The Body" in Bei n;:; ~Sl.]·Tothingne,13s, trans. Eazel E. 
Barnes {Ne\'1 Yorl:: Philosophical Library, 1956), pp. 303-59. 
He writes, nBeine;-for-it solf must be wholly body and it .w.ust 
be wholly consciousness; it cannot be united v;itll a body,n 
p. 305. . 
?Vlili'red Desan, for e::x:ar:ple, takes sartre to task for this 
in his l2.ter v1riting. nThe propin(1uity, even the actual inter-
penetration of llli:ld and "mattern-terms vihich are not sartrean, 
I admit'-ho..ve beco1;·:e such that it is no longer possible to keep 
the concept of matter (or its corresponding tenu) out of the 
definition or man." The l:~nr~dSl'Q of Jean-Paul Snrtre (Nev; York: 
Doubleday and Corapany, · l9.C6} , p. 281. · • -
~iQ;if<i!l'<i''H 1., .. qj$ 
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staggered by the false optimism and the fliGht before the tragic 
which he felt characterized Americans. 9 / 
The Bour~eois World.-Jnnally, the ·world is bourgeois, 
domina. ted by a pri vlec1ged social class and. scarcely conscious 
of the injustice involved. It was this factor ·which undoubtedly 
eventually bro U€J.lt Sartre to a realization of the real values 
of mar:xi sm.lO 
In addition to these factors that Fr. Rideau lists, there 
were such social problems as the condition of J.I'rance after the 
war Yh ich undoubtedly had an effect; on Sartre. Pierre-Henri 
Simon sumEarizecl the oondi tion well. 
Thro·wn into a universe vdthout coherence or order, 
v1here instincts and brute force triumph, IV here individual 
destinies are t·nisted and reviled by vague, blind and 
irreversible historical forces, these men no longer either 
could or would believe in the ideal 1'!19.11, in a reign of the 
spirit, in the transcendent finality of a future promise of 
justice and happiness .11 
The tragic is the funde.een tal motif of EB n who find thense lves 
9simon3 de Beauvoir gives us an excellent account of this 
visit. "Sartre V!as dazed by everything that he savi ••• the con-
fonnism of .Arrrericans, their scale of V<:W.,tiBS, their myths, their 
false optimisiJ., their flig.1.t before the tragic.n La Force des 
Choses (?aris: Gallimard, 1963), Po 45. 
--
lOsartre himself indicc~tes that it ·was not reading Marx 
that brou.sh t hi."'l t o !.:arri &il. 
It was abou'c this time 1925 that I read Co.uital and GerL:an 
~<?2--'?..~:L· I found everytl1 i113 pe:~fectly cl ear;-and I really 
understood nothint; •••• This readinz did not chance lYle. BY 
con trust, vi'1at cUd be sin to change rae i'Jas the reality ot 
Ear.A:is.n., the heavy presence on my horizon of tfie nri""sse s o:f 
VJOr1~ers • • 0 n 
Search for a !'Tethod, tr:1ns. Eazel ~. Barnes (Nev; Yorl;:: Alfred 
A. Knop.I":-:rJ6·s~), :P:?· 17-18. 
11Pierre-1{e1IT. 
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thrown into this ldnd or universe. The tragic is "the :reeling 
of' an obscure and insane resistance against ·which 'the force of' 
liberty and reason which is in man is dashed to :pieces~trl2 It 
is imperative to underst;and t..rrat this is the background against 
v1hi ch Sartre must be set. 
Finally, in this review of' inf'luences on Sartre, rote 
s..'hould be made o:r the pecularily French concern ·v·li th le neant, 
nothingness. It car1e into prominence in tl::e litte nineteenth 
century, and can be traced throu§1 Flaubert, Eallarm.e, Ri..'1lbaud, 
Baudelaire, and. others .. 13 This nothingness is not an abstract 
category, but has the def'inite flavor of concrete ex2erience • 
. 
This has been clearly seen by Robert Martin. Adara.s. ~ti'ter a 
detailed analysis or the idea of neant in late nineteenth cen-
tury·literature, he com.ments on the French concern for noth-
ingnesso 
No combina·tion of social factors or intellectt:al infl1,1ences 
seel:!l.S adequate to explain the number of respectable and 
establia.1.ed French nen of lo.tters who during the last 
half or tl-:e nineteenth century proclai..."!led their settled 
convic"'liion that the co s:nos did not exist. soue principle 
of mass r_eproduction seera.ed to .have taken over, some prin-
caplo of spiritual existence to have perished •••• It is 
not just that·God P~s disappeared behind the screen of 
l3sartre himself' has v!ri ttE;m significant amounts on two 
of' these authors. c.f. Jean-Paul Sartre, Baudelaire, trans. 
Martin Turnsll {New York: Nev1 Directions, !950}. }!-'i'Qr his 
treatnl9 nt of Flaubert, see Sartre, Search for a. l.:ethod, espec-
ially .pp. 1-!.0-50. The section on Flaubert fs -rnteb'aea-, hold-
ever, as an example of Sartre 's prosressive-recrc:3sive nethod 
as 'l<lelil as a work of literary criticism. ,.,,. . 
his crea·Gt2n ••• The screen itself is felt not to exist 
any rro re • --
/ 
sartre certainly stands as a prime exnJ'lple of this J!'rench 
feeling for nothingness, for it is in terns of this that he 
defined man himself. 
In SUIJI:lary, '/Je have seen many of the influences on the 
9 
sartre:.:ln milieu: the philosophy of idealisu, technology, tm 
conforrJ.ism of conte.D:porary social organization, the optimism 
of the bourgeois world, the tragic situation of post-war mn, 
and the French ooncern with le neo..nt. To v;ha.t conclusions 
can we come about the values to v;h ich Sartre wi 11 adhere? 
First, the ooncern with the freedom of man emerges. The 
reaction against the b::> urgeois, teCJ.'lnical world of oonformis:a 
demands the assertion of the freedom of man, rcan's ability 
to rise above and transform his situation. It is to tl1is pur-
pose that the idea of nothingness is used: defining man in 
terms of his consciousness, v1hich is the nothingness of co.'l1.-
sciousness, unties consciousness from the bondage of any things. 
:r.:an is liberty. 
Second, the use of nothin3ness is given a twist to combat 
false opti.m.ism. Consciousness, as a neant, must always be a 
negation. It can never becone one "~Jdth its object. Thus there 
is no ideal synthesis of consciousness, as one might find in 
10 
the \'·Tritings of Teilhard de Chardin. The tragic situation of 
post-war Europe cannot be hidden from view by a fe;J..'se ·optimism. 
Man's tragic, ontic situation will be rat.l.acted in the ontological 
structure of oonsciousness as a notl1ingness. 
The fo roe, then, of these particular in:tluences on sartre 
is to demand the assertion of his vi.,s ion of man as tragic and 
free. Before investigating this probleB in any greater detail, 
esLe cially its bearing on the question of God and the Other, 
I shall show how this vlsion of man as tragic and free is one 
of the l€dtimotife of Sartre 's ontological fra.'D.ework in Beins 
and Nothingness. Through this I hope to show not only the 
ontological foundations of this vision of the tragic and free 
man, but also the way in which this vision prepares the v1ay 
:ror sartre 's views. on Gcxl • 
The Ontological Fraw.eworl~ 
In Be i.'!!} and I'{othingness Sartre gives us an essay in phen-
omenological ontology. He presents tv1o types of being or, more 
precisely, one type of being and one type or non.-being. There 
is being-in-itself (1 •etre-en-soi) and being-for-itself (1 'etre-
pour-ro ~}. Whereas being-in-itsel:r is composed of all that vlhich 
is the object of consciousness' being-for-itself is conscious-
ness, negation of being-in-itself. Consciousness is a nothing-
ness, a neant. It is al·ways other than being. As such, it is 
not a thing. One cannot point to a pure consciousness. Con-
sciousness, as relatedness, is alvilays consciousness .£! SOLtet~1ing. 
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Tbe most important implication of this view of conscious-
ness ·as a radical negation is the Sartrean notion j>f freedom. 
Consciousness, as negation, is free because it can trm1scend 
(negate} anything of ·which it is conscious. l\:Ioreover, for 
Sartre, consciousness ~ liberty. It can transcend anything. 
Thus he writes, ttfreedoiu. is actually one with the being of the 
for-it self; human reality is free to the exact extent that it 
has to be its own moi:ihingness. nl5 
Sartre distinguishes three ways in which consciousness is 
a nothingness, a neant.l6 First, it tanporalizes itself; it 
is far from itse],i' by being either before or after itself• 
Second, it is consci.ousne"Ss of something, thus negating that 
of which it is conscious. Third, it is a transcendence, a 
:project, directed toward its own end. .All three of these 
structures express ways in ·which consciousness is a nothing-
ness. 
Consciousness is man for Sartre. Man is nothing but his 
consciousness. There is no hur~~ nature; there is not even a 
substantial ego for:aally admitted by Sartre. As 1\'1. Varet has 
:put it, Sartre has explo~ed t.r...e egu .1? Yet this is not to deny 
15sartre, . Be ins and Noth in€_iness , p. 453. 
16Ibid., pp. 31-32. This third nihilo.tion, "the nothing-
ness which is the condition of all transcendent negation, u can 
only be elucidated in terms of the first t;,:~o negations. Ibid., 
-p. 34. 
l?ailbert Varet, L'Ontologie de Sartre. (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de Fr&'1.ce, 1~48), p •. 101. 
---·----·-~ 
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that there is a certain facti city present. Man nay transcend 
. his situation, any situation, but there is aJ:ways )Scm:.e situa-
tion. 
Man's relation to the Other is fully explored on the in-
dividual level. I may be made an object to the other v'ihen he 
becomes conscious of me. There is nothing I can do to force 
a change in this, for his consciousness is also free. t~ore-
over, I can nake an object out of the Other. This structure 
·will be more fully e~cplored in Part Tv.o • Suffice it to rre ntion 
here that this same strllcture ·.vill be develo·oed in 3artre 's ,_ 
Critlque de la Raison dialectique when it becoiT:.es explanatory 
of man's inhumanity to'.:~ard Lun: ·when, because of scarcity or 
need (~2!!!), I rus.li:e an object out of the other. 
The adequate response to this situation e rr...er ges under the 
category of action. SiDlOne de Beauvoir has again gives us 
valuable backgcound for this. Sartre responded to the shat-
te ring effect of the war by the creation of a morality of au-
thenticity: " ••. from the point of view of liberty, all situa-
tions are equally able to be saved if one· assimilates them 
throuc.h a project .n18 She notes that this is close to the 
stoic v~e·w, for often the only vmy a situation can be trans-
cended is throug..h. submission. This derrand for passivity con-
cealed by verbal protestations v;as quickl.y- rejected by sartre 
18simone de Beauvoir, La Force des Choses, p. 15. 
13 
in favor of act ion in a transitory i:',rorld. 
Thinking, writing, his priruordial concern was ;to know 
meanings; but, after reading Heidegger and Saint-Exupery 
in 1940, he was convinced that J.neanings come. to the world 
by the enterprises of rr.e n: the practical takes priority 
over the conte~plative.l9 
Action is the adequate response to the changing human situa-
tion.20 
Yet Sartre mver reaches the point villere he allows any 
to na. of final satisfaction, for man is alvw.ys separated frOUl 
his own esscnce.21 AS negation, and as project, man desires 
to become that v;hich be negates. This is \\hy man is a futile 
passion: nothingness cannot be being. Man is always other 
than that of i'vhi ch he is -consciousness, even his 0'\'lll wo rli:. 
It is here that ·we begin to dis cover the ontological roots 
of Sartre's atheism, in his vision of 1nan as free but forever 
19Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
20rrhus Sartre writes, " ••• ':ve act before positing our pos-
sibilities and these possibilities which are disclosed as real-
ized refer to 1ueanings which necessitate special acts in· order 
to be put in to question." ~n~ an?- Nothingnes_s_, p. 37. Thus 
it is action vvhich brings .meaning into- t.L~e vJorld. 
21In comr;Emtating on Hegel's statement, "We sen is t Vias 
[:28\Vesen ist," Sartre explains hov; man is separa·ted :t:ro.m hJ.s 
ovm essence 1 
Essence is everything in the human beinB which we c3.n 
indicate by the VJords-that iso Due to this fact it is 
the totality of characteristiCs v1hich e:::oluin the act. 
But the act is always beyond that essence; it is a human 
act only in so far us it surpasses every e;cplanation 
VJhich v1e can give of it, precisely because the very ap-
plication of the for:uula "tll!.:i t is n to man causes all that 
is de signa ted, to pa ve-beon. 
1?._ein3 a.p.d l!C?thin~sness, p. 35. 
14 
tragic. 
In conclusion, we can see that there are macy factors in 
Sartre 's background vvhich prep:1red him to see man as tragic 
and free. Moreover, we can see that the .freedom and the fu-
tility o.f man has a clear place in Sartre's ontological struc-
ture in Bein_$ and Nothin_gness_. Vlhat, then, is the precise 
sense of this "tragic motif" in Sartre? 
It is, .first of all, a tension. The tragic e:d sts not 
as a given, but rat.'ler as the result of tv1o previous forces. 
In general, these rr..ay be identified as man's desire to be ful-
filled and his clear recognition of the futility of this desire. 
r:r the interception of these two forces produced a stoic resig-
nation or a feeling of great humility before God, the result 
would not be tragedy. Only when the resultant is sone type of 
passionate tension between these tv1o forces do we have tragedy. 
For Sartre it is action in the hw.:a.an project Vihich is expres-
sive of man's tragic situation. It is this' framework which 
will give the foundation for Sa1·tre 's atheism. 
15 
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CHAPTER II 
BEING AND HOTHING1{:3i8S: THE CRITI Q,U~ OF 
RELIGI OU3 EXPERIENCES 
Sartre has much to say about both relieious experiences 
and the ontological difficulties in spea1dng about God. The 
latter topic vlill be considered in the follovling chapter. It 
is the purpose of this chapter to consider in detail Sartre's 
critique of .£...€l;l.igious experienc~. It ·will be seen that through-
out this critique the dual values of man's freedom and tragic 
situation are central to Sartre's position. The tension betvJCen 
man's freedom and his futile hopes for reconciliation result 
in a tragic vision of religious experience which I shall here 
explicate. 
The first question which aust be faced is the justifica-
tion of this order of treatment.. The fundar:o.e ntal issue here 
is V~a.~ether Sartre 's critique of religious e:cperiences issues 
from his logical problems v1i th the existence of God or vice 
versa. Hazel E. &l.rnes, the fore:~10st translator of sartre's 
philosophical Vio rh:s, thinks that his stand rests ultimately 
on logical grounds. 
The question has been as!\:ed as to just v;hy since Sar-
tre 's YJhole interpretation of existence postulates the 
pursuit of God, he is not ·willing to go one step furt;her 
and postulate a God v1ho exists ••• or a valuable myth vJith 
inspir-ational power?. o. I think he \Vou..ld reject the 
notion that God really exists because the idea appears 
to him false on logical grotmds.22 / 
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The clear implication of this statem.ent v;ould appear to be that 
since God is a logical contradiction, he cannot exist and tmst 
be rejected. 
I would suggest that in this respect Miss Barnes's analysis 
is perhaps too naive. It could be argued that, at least chrono-
logically, logic follows upon the situation rather than deter-
. . t '"'17; mJ.nes J .• ~u To recast an old dilerlillla, does 3ar·t.re not believe 
in God because he is a contradiction, or does sartre find God 
contradictory· because he does not believe in him..24 .... Uthough 
J~:iss Barnes opts for· the 1'or1uer alternative, the latter seems 
to me to be rn.o re probable. 
22rrazel E. Barnes, "Translator's Introduction," Being 
and Nothingness, p. zxxiv. 
23This is, of. course, a very delicate issue. J?or SLlpport 
of this vievJ, the reader is referred to :Bruno Snell's The 
Dis cove :cy of' the Vind : The Greek Or i~~ ins __ o!,_£.~,.?.J22an TlWu{tl t , 
trans. T. G. Hosenr.Leyer {:iJevJ Yo:rk: Harper and Row, ""-1%1, esp. 
pp. 191-245. Snell here .traces the origins of logic in Greek 
literature and philosophy. 
24willimn Earle makes a telling point on this issue. 
" ••• on the nost abstract dialectical level, he Sartre 
defines C'..od as a contradiction; but we .have just finished 
reading his defense of co11.tradiction, in v:hich he makes 
contradiction itself the very central core of c anscious-
ness! The co·nclusion in school loe;ic ~ .. muld be that God 
exists as consciousness, but Sartre's contentioi:t is that 
there is no such thing at all." 
Chri~-~ia_;t.i_tl, ~d EJ; istentia~ism (J.'van~ton: Northvmstern Uni-
ve rs1. ty }'rosr::, !9o'S J, p. 10?. The poJ.nt 1.s well taken: 8artre t s 
loc;ic folJ_ovJs upon sorB prior CO!:>..rJi tments. 
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If it is then conceivable that 3artre 's atheism is based 
on sotne prior comrui tsents, the next question to be asked is 
/ 
'\'vhat these commitr:1ents are. The fundamental spirit of these 
corunitments is the drive for 1aan to know hiruself. 25 That which 
is most central in man's vision of huaself is his free and 
tragic situation, the nature of which has been discuf:lsed above. 
T'ne rr.anner in which Sartre approaches the topic of man's reli-
g>us self-realization is throuGh a critique of religous ex-
:periences. I ahc.ll consider first the experience of God. This 
will be folloned by a consideration of various religiousthe:m.es: 
origino.l sin, death, and eternity. 
The E~~erience of God 
If one of the primary concerns of Sartre's philosophy is 
seen to be located in his vision of man as tragic and free, 
it appears that it is these·t·vJo values which are in direct 
conflict VJi th any e:r:!)e rie nee of God. For Sartre, .nan does 
not just have freedor1, he is liberty. This freedon must be 
preserved at all costs, especially in the face of God. ..-\.fter 
his discussion of les };=ouches, H. Paissac SUL11l~:arizes well the 
relationship between God and liberty. 
25rn v·Jriting about the problen of God's existence, sartre 
declared that it made no difference v;hether God existed. "Not 
that VlG WOUld believe that God cexists, but ·we thinl: that the 
problem is mt one of his existence; it is necessary that-m:rn 
Yind himself and convince hiMself that nothing can save him 
from himself, even a viable proof of the existence of God.n 
S~rtre, L 'Exis ten ti eJ.i Sl;le est u.~."1 huraanisme, p. 95. Italics 
nnne. 
We see, in all these texts, the true nature of 
liberty is affirmed: to be capable of no longer 
having any dependance ·wi tJ1 ree;ard to God. Sue~~.' a 
liberty kills the gods. 
An& if God, in reality, were to exist, it is the 
liberty-of ruan v'.hich would no longer have a place.26 
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It is above all the conflict betv!een God and man in terms of 
freed.om with which Sartre concerns himself. One of the roots 
of Sartre 's atheism is in his demand for human freedom. 
If this absolute conflict betv;een the freedom and man and 
the existence of God is taken as a given, then the purpose ot 
Sartre's ontology emerges as an attempt to explain hl..llt:lan free-
dom. It is this point which Niiss Barnes sees clearly. 
Sartre 's whole endeavor is to explain man's pr edica-
ment in human terms '~./rithout postulating an existent 
God to guarantee anything. Those who read him as reli-
gous are· saying that one may be relieious \Vithout any 
non-human absolute. This .rnay be true, but Sartre says 
in effectothat ~~ must call such a position atheistic 
hm'lanisn. ~:.o? 
Miss Barnes implies that it is impossible to use the v.ord 
"religious11 without sone non-hur.J8.n absolute. Although this 
may _be true, there rer!lains the l:ilOre fundamental question to 
· be answered: despite his :pro testa ti ons to the contrary, does 
not God function as soL~ kind ·or absolute, even if it be an 
absolute threat? 
2~. Paissac, Le Dieu de Sartre (Paris: Arthaud, 1950), 
pp. 16-1?. Author's tra:nslation. 
2'1Barnes, "Tren slat or's Introduction," Being and· Nothing-
ness, p. :x:x:L"'t. 
-
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To investigate this, considE:~r first the relation betv;een 
freedom and our desire to be God. In discussion tbe for-itself 
as a free choice, Sartre says that, ttThus m.y freedom is a choice 
of being God and all my acts, all my projects translate this 
choice ani reflect it in a thousand and one ways, for there 
is an infinity of ways of being and ways of having.n28 The 
terra of my absolute freedom ·would be my becoming God. Thus 
it is that Sartre describes God in terms of nan's ideal. 
The fundamental aim found in· the hur:.an project is to be-
comE the in-itself-for-itself, expressed by consciousness's 
desire to be the foundation of its ov·m being-in-itself by pure 
self-consciousness. 
It is th.is ideal ·which can be called God. 'fuus the 
best way to conceive of the f'undarn.ental project of 
human reality is to say that man is the beinG v1ho se 
project is to be God. vrnatever rn.ay be t.he I.:yths and 
rites of the religion considered, God is first 11 sen-
sible to the heart" of lli.an as the one who identifies 
and d~~ines him in his ultimate anc~ fundamental pro-
ject •2 
Here tv.o fundarnental notions of God appear. He is first an 
ontological concept vzh ich defines man. Moreover, he is also 
an ontic reality in that the concept of God expresses man •s 
self-definition.30 
28Sartre, Beinfs. and Nothinr91;es,s,, p. 599. 
29Ibid. 
-
30Tne influence of Nicolai Eart.m.ann is evident here and 
in other places. See Appendix II for a discussion of this. 
Thus God energes on both the ontolo.sical and the ontic 
levels as a lin:ti ting concept. / 
God, value and suprerce end of transcendence, represents 
the perrranent limit in terms of which Kan m.akes lmown 
to himself what he is. To be .man means to reach to·ward 
being God. Or if 1ou prefer, r0an is fundamentally the 
desire to be Goc1. 3 
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In this manner God defines man while at the sm:le time rr..an de-
fines God in a continuous dialectic. 
Here the concert of freedor.1 comes to the fore as a prob-
lem. It ·would appear that, if man is defined as the being ·whose 
project it is to be God, then this comes close to g::i ving man 
an essence or hurnan nature, and thus lir.uitine his freedor!l in 
some ontological manner. · Sartre saves himself f roru this di.l-
emru.a by a distinction betvJeen the abstract meaning of desire 
and the concrete expression of it. " ••• rnile the peanin~ of 
tre des ire is ul tirrately the project of being God, the desire 
is never constitutec1 by this meaning; on the contrary, it al-
ways represents a particular discovery of its ends.n32 At 
this point in the text Sartre avo ids the deeper issue implied 
here: If God does not exist, and if man is fundanentally the 
desire to be God, it v;ould appear that man's e:cis tence is a 
fundamental contradiction. 
3lsartre, Beinf5 ~d Nothin;:;_ness, p. 566. 
32Ibid o, pp. 566-67. Itctl i.e s in orieinal. Tile vc.lid i ty 
of this-O:"i."stinction is open to q_uestion, f'or it 'ltJO..lld appear 
that the ontic concept af God indeed does constitute the meaning 
of particular projects. 
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In a well-known passae;e, Sartre follovJs out the implica-
tions of this position. / 
Every human reality is a passion in that it projects 
losing it self so as to found being and by the sam.e stroke 
to constitute the In-itself which escapes contingency 
by being its own foundation~ the Ens causa sui, which 
religions call God. 'rhus the pass ion of' nan is the 
reverse of that of Christ, for man poses himself as 
man in order that Gcd may be born. But the idea of 
God is con tra.dictory and we lose ourselves in vain. 
Jvian is a useless passion.33 
The thrust of this passage is that man is an eternal contra-
diction, of whiCJ.'-1 God is the highest symbol. It should be 
noted here, however, that the equation of Ens causa sui and 
a religious God here is gratuitous. We a.1.all return to this 
point below. 
This condition, the basence of God, is not confined to 
man alone. It refers to the very structures of existence it-
self. 
Everything happens as if the world, man, and wan-in-
the-world succeeded in realizing only a 11issing God. 
Everything happens therefore as if· the·ir:..-itself and 
tbe for-itself were presented in a state of disintegra-
tion in relation to an ideal synthesis. Nor that the 
integration has ever. taken J2lace but on the contrary 
precisely because it is alvJays indicated and always 
impossible.34 
God then appears to function in a most unusual way in terms of 
huc.an action. The iro.age of God stands up aga:inst the human 
project as the representation of that vihich erlstence must 
33Ib · . 615 ~ , p. • 
34Ibid., p. 623. 
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strive tmvard, out which it can never attain •. Yet again there 
is an e~'Uivocation between the ontic meaning of Goj and his 
ontoloeical status for Sartre as the impossible union of the 
in-itself and the for-itself. Moreover, it appears that the 
ontological concept is the primary referent for determining 
what the antic neaning of God is. 
Thomas J. J. Altizer has clearly se0n tile function of this 
missing God that Sartre presented in the previous po.ssage. God 1 
who is to be nihilated, is the supreme Other and definitely 
perfor~s a function in defining man's freedom. 
The act of nihilation is not simply a nihilation of 
being but depends upon a p3.rallel and simultaneous 
nihilntion of God: both Ga:l and being must be nihil-
a ted by man's project af freedom. When sartre says, 
ttEverything happens as ll' the ·world, 1:.an, and liLI1ll-in-
the-v.orld succeeded in realizing only a missing God, u 
he might mor~ aptly say that man's freedom derr.ands a 
missing God. u5 
Thus in some manner God functions in this passage as an ab-
solute, the negation of v1hich gives suprer.J.e expression to human 
freedom. Yet Altizer too avoids here the issue of the antic 
and ontological concepts of God: man's freedon der::.ands a rn.issing 
God, but is it necessar-.r that this nissing God be an impossible 
union of the in-itself and the i'or-itself which therei'ore cannot 
exist? 
Sartre addresses hiwself to this question when he. defends 
35Thmnas J. J • .Altizer, L~ircea Elis.de and the Dialectic 
of the Sacred (Philadelphia: 'l't.e ·,;estr..linster .r?ress, · .l.'o.lo0), 
p. 13?. -
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himself ae;ainst the c.~arge of hypostatizing some type of God. 
Let no one reproach us with capriciously :i.!Wenting 
a being of this kind; lvhen by a fur·ther move.r;1en t of 
tho u@lt the being and. absolute absence of this totality 
are hypostasized as transcendent beyond the v:orld, it 
takes on the name of God. Is not God a being who is 
what he is-in that he is all positivity and the founda-
tion of the VJorld-and a.t t.lJ.e sar2.e time a being vvho is 
not v.hat he is and v:ho is \':hat he is not-in that he is 
self-consciousness and the necessary foundation of him-
self? The being of huma.n reality is sufferi:r..g because 
it rises in being as perpett1c'1lly haunted by a totality 
'\'ihic.D. it is without being able to be it, precisely be-
cause it could not attain t.lJ.e in-itself without losing 
itself as for-itself. Hm·a.a.n reality therefore is by 
nature an unhappy consciousne~S with no possibility of 
surpassine its unhappy state. 
The line of the a-rgUI(B nt would appear to be SOJrer.hat shaky here. 
A transcendent God cannot. be hypostasized because he is a con-
tradiction within the con text of the for-itself and the in-itself. 
Then this ontologiccl oonceyt is said to repres•:3nt the dream 
which haunts man and reveals to hi:n his mvn futility. The con-
elusion at.' the final sentence logically restG upon a non-e:ds-
tent and contra.dicto ry ontological cone opt of God. Just as 
in the passages above, Sartre does not consider -vvhet.~er this 
onto logical concept is \'Jllat v;e rce an by God. 
In sunmary, it can. be said that Sartre's descriptions ot 
our ex_periences of God are by and large based on an onto logical 
conce:;>t of God as an impossible contradiction. Sartre then 
uses this OJ nce:pt to irrt erpret eJ-.'J_) erience to e:q>lai n man's 
35sartre, Bcin;; and Hothi!!,;:;ness_, p. 90. 
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unhappin~ss. This particular ontological concept of C'70d appears 
necessary to maintain Sartre 's view of human realit1 as a per-
petual unhappy consciousness. Thus a certain view of human 
experience dictates Sartre' s view of God, yet tv10 alternatives 
have gone unexamined. l',irst, is this t.~e only description of 
experience which is adequate? Second, is this deocription of 
God adequate to our experience? The seco n:1 quest ion will be 
considered in Part Two of t.1.is thesis. .At present let us turn 
to a consideration of the first que s ti on, but confined to the 
area of specific rel igous experiences. 
Traditional Religious Experiences 
In this section, I shall consider several ttreligousu 
themes that Sartre co.mmerrtis upon :in Being and Nothingness .• 
They offer to us so1ne substantiation of his interpretation of 
htunan reality, especially in relation to religion. As suoh, 
they form. an elaboration or· his viev1s on atheism. Moreover, 
the validity of much of what Sar-tre says here viill reveal why 
his atheism has the popularity and relevance it does. 
) 
Origina·l_ ~:!-_!_1 and Guilt .-In his cor!llllents on original sin, 
Sartre attempts to present a picture of it in light of man's 
fundan.ental .relation to the Other. In so doing, Sartre reduces 
original sin to our primordial relation with the Other. 
If there is an Other, whatever or VJhoeve;t.i. ho may be, 
whatever r:.ay be his relations with me, and without his 
acting upon me in any way except by the· pure upsurge of 
his being-then I have a..'l'l outside, I h<1Ve a nature. ·"MY 
original fall is the e:dstence of the Other. Sham.e 
-like pride-is t;he apprehension of myself as/: nature 
although that very nature e scapcs me and is urumowablc 
as such .36 . 
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Thus, ttsharae is the feeling of an or5..~inul fall,n37 not because 
of any particular act, but because ti1is is my fundruaental con-
di tion of having "fallen" into the world. As such, it is in-
escapable. 
Nor is it possible to become cleansed of this guilt by 
any type of self-realization. 1viy guilt stems from the fact 
that by m.y own self-assertion I constitute the· other as an ob-
ject and an instrruuent, thus bringing about mutual alienation. 
11 Thus original sin is my .upsurge in a ·world ·where there are 
.others; and whatever Hay be my further relations vJith others, 
these relations \Vill be only variations on the original theme 
of iilY guilt.n38 No matter what I do to the other, I can treat 
hLu only as an ooject.39 
Thus the structures of-Sartre's attitude tovvard r0ligous 
experience begin to emerge. God represents the ideal of the 
36Ibid. p. 263. 
-- ' 
37Ibid., PP. 283-89. 
38Ibid -. , p. 410. 
3 9sartrc 's analysis here is again a mixture of psycho-
logical and ontological structures. There is, however, no 
fundamentr:tl conflict betvJeen the two. Original sin is a psy-
chological reality indicative of an ontological rupture at 
the heart of beinG. l''or the pte' poses of this analysis it is 
-not ne ce::wary to distinQJ.ish the t\·.o levels. 
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union bc;,tv.·een the for-it self and the in-itself. He is a con-
tr~diction, who is experienced as an absence. Man/is seen as 
the being whose project it is to be God. Original sin is seen 
to represent the initial rupture betwe:.:;n the tor-itself and 
the Other. l.~~an, as the striving to achieve this contradictory 
union of the in-itself and the for-itself, is nothing but the 
living out of this original contradiction under the m.ode of 
guilt. lEan is a futile passion striving tovJard the highest 
contradiction, the union of the in-itself and the for-itsel:f. 
This 1 eads Sartre to comr!len t on several other religious 
notions. Eternity and death will now be considered here. 
Eternityo-Sartre connects the notion of eternity with 
that impossible dream of becon:lng one VJith myself f·orever.40 
"The et;ernity v.hich .r..an is seeking is not the infinity of 
duration, of that vain pur&uit after the self for which I am 
myself responsible; man seeks a repose in self, the atEf:lpor-
ali ty of the absolute coincidence with himself .u41 It is im-
plied here that eternity offers man a false promise of reality 
to core in another time. 
This criticis:n of eternity is not far from that offered 
40The interpretation here is concerned 1iJi th Being and 
Nothinsne ss. A critique of this notion of e terni =ty Ts also 
quite-evident in 3artre 's "~No E~ci t, 11 ·wherein he shows that 
even in eternity one can.not recover oneself. c .f. Jean-paul 
Sartre, fiiO Exit a_ncl Three Other Plays {He\J York: VintaGe, 1961). 
4-lsartre, Being and Nothin,,~nesE_, pp. 111-42. 
2? 
by Eliade in his critique of sacred time, when, "throu@l the 
reactualization of his myths, religous man attempt,g to approach 
the gods and to participate in p~~AG; the imitation af para-
di&~atic divine models expresses at once his desire for sanc-
tity and his ontological nostalgia.u42 This same principle 
is extended to those eschatoloe;ies which attanpt to place a 
final salvation in some future moment. 
Periodic regeneration of the Creation is replaced by a 
single regeneration that will take place in an in illo 
~av;pore to COl<le. But the VJill to put a final and Uef'fn.-
l.tl.V0 end to history is itself still an anhistorical at-
titude, exactly e.s are the other traditional conceptions.43 
Thus we can see more clearly the force of the objections of 
Sartre to the traditional· idea of eternity. Eternity, if it 
means anythinc;, ·would appear to relegate the value of the here-
and-nov; to a posit ion of secondary importance, subordinate to 
sacred time in either r,~ths or the Parousia. As such, it is 
a strcutre by -vvhich :man attan.pts to participate in the being 
of tbe gods. Such an attenJ.pt, according to sartre, is doomed 
to failute and must be revealed as such.~ 
42_tvrircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane (Nevv Yorlc: 
Harper and Row, 1961), p. 106. 
4~/Lircea Eliade, Cosn:o s and Hi.s.tory: The J.~yth of the 
~nal Return (New Yorl~:· Harper and Row, l96l), p. ll2."-
44zliade, although he offers us a very useful :Lratnev;ork 
in vmich to criticize certain conceptions of' time as anhis-
torical, still has troubles hinself- with Christianity and 
history. Ee attempts to say that Christianity can save the 
his to rica.l event by having it both sacred and profane sim-
ultaneously. In criticizing this, :Utizer :points out, "by 
J 
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Death .-In a similar manner, Sartre treats of the Chris-
tian idea of death. Writing in reference to the C)li'istian idea 
of the "appointed time," Sartre says, "if it is the closing 
of the account which gives our life its zreaning and its value, 
then it is of little importance that all the acts of v:lb.ich the 
web of our life is made bave been free; the very meaning of 
them. esc<:;p es us if we do not ourselves choose the moment when 
the account v1ill be closed. n45 Thus as long as death is not. 
a free determination of our being, it cannot be seen as a com-
pletion of our ov'ln life. Death is thus Lmposed from without 
and, "does not appear on the foundation; it can only rem.ove 
all meaning from life. n45 Thus_ it is that death as gi..ven :t'roru 
another fixes rc.y freedom, robs me CJ! the meaning of my life .47 
•rt>y his O\-v.n principles, the sacred and profane are related by 
a ·negative diale otic, a single moment cannot be sacred and 
profane at qne time." ThorJ.as J. J •. Utizer, Iv:ircea Eliade 
and the D:ialectic of the Sacred, p. 55. Altizer 1 s answer to 
this lJ.es in his notJ.on of the coincidence ·of opposites,-
v.herea_s Sartre resolves tbe problem by the elinlination of one 
of the op:posites, the sacred. The question of whether a uni-
fication is possible ·will be considered belm·l, but no defini-
tive answer can be given here. 
45sartre, Being and Hothin@less, p; 538. 
46rbid., p. 539. 
47rt should be noted here that the proper concern of this 
section is the Cv.ristian notion of death as Sartre presents it. 
The concern is to s.l1 o:u the logic of such a position, given llfiis 
initial condition. The critique of the Sartrean idea of death 
given by Regis Jolivet in his Le ?roble.me de la l1~ort chez M. 
!]e~d.efL~er et_§ .-1") •• sartre. (Abbaye Saint 1iandrille: J.mitlons 
ue :b'ontenelle, l95U) is valuable, but not to the particular 
·concern of this section. 
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Most fundamentally, however, in the idea of Christian 
death~ is rooted the idea that death, besides nihi~ating my 
possibilities and destroying my projects, is the ultimate 
"triuz:1ph of the point of vie·w of the Other over the point ot: 
view which I am toward myself. 48 The implication, never :made 
explicit, is that in a Christian view death is the ultimate 
tri urn ph of God over what I am to myself. 
Again we can turn to Eliade for co.ni'irmation of this fun-
damental structure of death as the triunph of the Other. In 
a discussion of the rites of passage, E).iade sees tha. t death 
involves a change in ooth ontological and social status • 
. The dead person has t.o underep certain ordeals that 
ooncern his onn destiny in the afterlife, but he must 
also be reoognized by the corun1uni ty of the dead and 
accepted among then.. For sone :feOples, only ritual 
burial confirms death; b9 ·who is not buried accordinB 
to custom is not dead. Elsewhere a death is not con-
sidered valid until after the funerary ceremonies have 
been perfol~ed, or until the soul of the dead person 
has been ri t'll3.lly conducted into its nev.; dwelling in 
the other world ~d there been accepted by the commun-
ity of the dead • ..:9 · . 
The point here, although Eliade· does not draw it out, is the 
control that _the Other exercises over the dead, l"lhether this 
Other be those who perform the funerary rites or the community 
48Sartre, Be ins and_ Nothingness, p. 540. 
· 49Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, p. 185. · The coin-
cidence is pointed out here to ShovT""tne :fundan;.ental roots of 
the notion of death that Sartre is crit icizine;. It is cer-
tain ly open to discussion whether this is a properly Chris-
tian notion of death or just a particular notion of deatfi tli'at 
may be found among various religions, including C.hristianity. 
30 
of the dead. Ei tb.er vvay the deaO. person is at their mercy. 
Moreover, this idea of death is. the gateway te{ a clear 
conception of our relation with the Other. nThe relation with 
the dead-with all the dead-is an essential structure of the 
fundu:mental relation which we have called 'being-for-otherso rn50 
This ·would appear to be the case not only on the ontological 
level, but also in the reah1 of psychology. In this respect 
Norman o. Brown sees the basic implications of death to man. 
Man is the a nim.al \Vhich has senarated into conflicting 
opposites the biological unity- of life_ and death, and 
has then subjected the conflicting opposites to repres-
sion. The destruction of the biolo5ical unity of life 
/ and death transforrus the Nirvana-principle into the 
pleasure-principle, t~ansfonill3 the repetition-compulsion 
into a fixation to the infuntile past, and transforms 
the death instinct into an aggressive principle of neg-
ativity. And all three of these s-_pecifically hunan char-
acteristics--tile pleasure~principle, the fixation to the 
past, and the aggressive negativism-are aspects of the 
characteristically hunan node of becoming, historical 
time .51 
Thus it is that death is revealed to us as that structure v;hich. 
most fundarrentally elucidates our relations with the Other. To 
admit a death which comes from ·God is to admit, for Sartre, the 
fundanental control over 3yself by the highest Other, God. con-
sequent upon this is the denial of any real free don to my pro-
ject because of God's Otherness revealed in death. 
There is, hO\Jever, another side of this picture of death, 
50sartre, Be ins and 1Jothi:l1.~ne~, p. 542. 
Blnor..::1an o. Brovm, Life Ar:;a.inst D3ath: The Psychoanalytical · 
Meanin~ of Hi,storl (Nevi York: ·-l~andon Eouso-, · 10o9), -P. 104. · 
one which Sartre naturally does not consider: the death of God. 
Insofar as God is Other, Sartre has succeeded in killing him. 
/ 
Nor does it end there. Sartre has personally assumed the re-
sponsibility for the funeral. The rites of passage have been 
laid down. God :must die as the Supreme Other, as the one who 
was most guilty of hubris: the One who tried to rob us of our 
freedom, that precious .freedorJ. to which we have conde1wed our-
selves. The choruses no longer lament the passing of a lover. 
Indeed, the Other has no contr.)l over hov1 we constitute him. 
We can, then, see the point to which ·we have advanced. 
God has been portrayed as the one who stands over against man 
as the supreme Other. He .. prepresents to man the apotheosis of 
that contradiction, the resolution of which has been shovm to 
be the fun(lax:..1ental and futile goal of huru.an life and thought. 
This is Sartre 's basic mode of being-toward God as explicated 
through an analysis of his statenents on religous eA~eriences 
in Being and Not.hi¥Aess. 
Yet Sartre does not stop here. His position has a most 
solid ontological underpinning. It is to the explication of 
this that we shall novJ turn our attention. 
/ 
CHAPTER III 
Beins ~nd Nothingness: The Ontological Critique 
or God's Existence 
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In this attempt to understand Sart:ce 's atheism, we have 
first surveyed the milieu within which Sartre crone to his 
atheistic hUDlaniau and then we have exan:dned his critiques of 
the experience of God and other religious experiences. In the 
process God has been reve~D.ed as an Other against whom sartre 
is constantly figh ti.ng. Yet his atheism claims to rest on an 
ontological foundation which precludes the existence of God. 
We now turn to consider that ontology. 
At first glance, there Vi.:>uld appear to be two fundamental 
categories in the Sartrean framevvurk: being-in-itself a.."ld being-
for-itself, 'that is, being and nothingness. Consciousness, as 
we said in Chapter One, nihilates the being-in-itself and thus 
constitutes it self as a nothingness, a consciousness of sene-
thing other than itself. 
Yet the situation, upon closer examination, appears to be 
in need of a more precise distinction. Althousll being and con-
sciousness are two funda:jwntal colllponents of Sartre' s system., 
they are not yet sufficient to stand alone. The negation of 
ru1y particular being-in-itself yet leaves consciousness only 
with a series of particular negations, not with the ontological 
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necessity that ~1ould belong to all being-for-itself. 
Thus ·the ontological role of God begins to em$Tge ~ GOd 
is the third fundamental catesury of Sartre 's ontology, and it 
is God that is the foundation of .man's radical freedom. Altizer 
has seen this when co;nmen ting on nthe paradoxical presence o:r 
the missing God. " Nothingness , being and God are the primary 
categories of Sartre 's philosophy. 
God, of course, does not exist. Nevertheless, he is the 
necessary d :ialectical foundation of the system. Only 
through a d:ia lectical negation of God does nihila tion-
the primordial act of hurnan freedom-avoid an othe ~vise 
inevitable absorption of its act into the being of God ••• 
Both God and being must be negated in the authen·tic crea-
tion of hU!.:J.nn. freedom.; apart from the negation of God, 
man would no longer be a nuseless passion," and hence, 
:most deeply, 1'X)Uld be: Again, Sartre 's system demon-
strates once more that the deepest affir£1ation of the 
prorane de:mands a radical negation of the sacred, which 
is to say that a dialectical relation exists betv;een the 
sacred and the profane, neither can become manifest apart 
from the negation of the other.52 
Here I tl:1inlc that Altizer hits on the fundarJ.ental J;"elation be-
t·ween God and man: God has be cone in Sartre 's system the founda-
tion of man's freedom through his negation. God's meanine; for 
Sartre L~ contained in his negation of God and is expressed in 
the idea or a missing God. 
Altizer goes on to take cognizance of the unacknowledged 
nature of this dialectical relationship. .Althou§l the dialectic 
is present, the consequences of it are not 
that meets ~Uti zer 's approval. 
51xutizer, Mircea J.:l:i.ade a..r1.d the Dialectic 
pp. 137-38. 
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Yet Sartre 's thought lu s not succeeded in reaching a 
full dialectical expression, it J:l..as not succeeded in 
identifying negation and affin"7lation, desyite tye fact 
that Sartre 's idea of nihilation so powerfully witnesses 
to the pa rado:dcal presence of the missing God .53 
Thus the force of 1Y1r. Altizer's criticisrJ. lies in his showing 
Sartre 's f[tilure to acknowledge the affirmation that is con-
tained in his negation of God. 
Yet .iUtizer 's taking to task of Sartre stops short. He 
fails to eJI.-plore the further depths of his own criticism as 
well as to judge it within the context of the .Sartrean frame-
work. He fails, finally, to say that the regation of God re-
pre sent s for sartre ·man's ultimate negation of himself in rela-
tion to any other. By denying the ontological union between 
being and nothingness, which is the irr.port of Sartre 's onto-
logical denial of God, Sa.rtre rejects the possibility of any 
real union with the Other. In Altizer's language, this means 
he rejects the coincidence of opposites. 
More serious, hOi,vever, is that :n~r • .F..ltizer neglects the 
relatio11s with tt.tO Otmr as providing a key to Sartre 's nega;_ 
tion of God. It is the mode of being we assume tmvard the 
Other that forms the paradigm for Sartre's treatment of GOd. 
To more fully appreciate this, Vie shall first examine the onto-
logical attitude of Sartre to:Jard the problem of God. Then v;e 
shall be ready to turn to a consideration of the relations 
53Ibid., p. 138. 
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with the Other to see po:in ts of comparison and advance our own 
criticism of Sartre 's atheism. / 
We have seen that God represents for n:an the ideal union 
of the being-in-itself and the being-for-itself. God is thus 
the fundar.1ental value vvhich presides over the project of man. 
The fundarn.ental value vJhich presides over this project 
is exactly the in-itself-for-itself; that is, the ideal 
of consciousness which would be the foundation of its 
ovm being-in-itself by the pure consciousness which it 
would have gt itsel:r. It is this ideal ·v1hich can be 
called God. 4 
The point of this passage is that God is the ideal of the union 
of the for-itself and tt£ in-itself. Yet it should be noted 
that the ontologica~ concept, the in-itself'-.for-itself, is not 
necessarill C~d. The equation of this ideal and GOd is not 
without justification, but it is ·without necessity .55 
The precise nature of this ideal of consciousness is the 
self-possessing and the self-creating being, that is, God. 
"The dyad, for-it self possessing and in-itself p assessed, is 
the same as that being 1.·.b.ich is in order to possess itself and 
54sartre, fu i!~'Land Jio,tf!J._nm.e§.s., p. 566. 
55This clifficulty appears to be aldn to the di.fficulties 
encountered in any argu.TUent for the existence of God;. In his 
arguments .for the e:;d stence of C-od, 3t. Thom.as .Aquinas con-
cludes each. argun2.enft v:ith statem.ents of tm form, "•o•£:nd this 
everyone ur.derstands to be God •••• it is necessary to admit a 
first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. rr 
~~~ne. ~c9log~ca I. I. 2. 3. c. It is, indeed, open to que~­
t~on v.he'Iiher "Hhat peo:ple mean by God is actually the same as 
the oonclusion of such an argw:~ent. On this point in relation 
to the teleological and cosn:ological argu...1~onts, see J. J. C. 
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whose possession is its own oreation-God.n56 This ideal re-
presents my desire to possess myself in my own fre~ foUndation, 
but the same gratuitous equation of this ideal with God is to 
be found here also. 
If·· Sartre fails to finally justify this equation of the im-
possible union of the in-itself and tl:e for-itself with ·God, he 
does succeed in attacking several notions ·of God vmich are in-
compatible with his framev.ork. Among these notions are those 
of God as a unifier, as a creator, as causa sui, and as the 
Third. We shall consider each of these. 
God is not a Unifer.-If one were to advance the hypothesis 
that God could be underst"Ood a.s ·some type of unifier, sartre 
can show quite clearly the difficulties of this conception 
within his franework. He must be either within or outside the 
totality, which in either case is an irupossi bility. 
The difficulty in speaking of Gcxl within the totality 
rests on Sartre 's particular view of consciousness. -
No consciousness; not even·God's, can "see the underside" 
-that is, apprehend the tntality as such. For if God 
is consciousness, be is integrated into the totality.57 
Smart, "The Existence of God," New Essays in Philoson..1.ical 
~heo,loGf, ed. Antony Flew and JUasdu'ir Macintyre"-{! .• ohcloh :' SCM 
Press, 963) , esp. pp. 42-46·. 
56sartre, Being and No.tl1ingness, p ~ 592. 
57. ~., :p. 302. 
37 
God, as consciousness, could not be outside of the whole that 
is consciousness and being. Consciousness cannot ~tand outside 
of itself and look upon itself. It is al;vays within the to-
tality.-
Nor is it possible according to Sartre to say that God is 
outside the totality, a non-conscious being. 
And if. by his. na~ure, he ~s a being be~ond COJJ:SCio~.sn~E! 
(that ~s, an ~n-ltself -v·;hich would be 1ts ovm l'ouna.a'tlon) 
still the totality c<:m appear to him only as obj~c.t (in 
that case he lacks the totality's internal disintegration 
as the subjective effort to reapprehend the self) or as 
subject (then since God is not this subject, he can only 
experience it without knovling it). Thus no point of view 
on the totality is oonceivable; the totality has no "out-
side," and tm very question of the meaning of the "under-
side11 is stripped of meaning. We can go no further.58 
God, within the framework of Sartrean being and consciousness, 
can be neitber ·wit.h.in nor outside of the totality. 
To say, however, that we can go no further is perhaps 
unjust. There are several alternatives which Sartr·e does not 
go on to con.sider. :b,irst, it may be that, within the context 
of Sartre's division of being and consciousness, it is impos-
sible to spenk of God's relation to us L"1 terms of &'Ubject and 
object. This does not mean that it makes no sense to speak or 
God in other ways. Second, it is q_uite possible that talic of 
the "totalityu is logically extraorclinary, for just viHl.t is 
this totality'? It lfiay, indeed, be only a totalizing process. 
It is not Ll}>Ossible, as Vlhitehead does s to taJlc about God in 
58Ibl. d., 30') p. - '-'• 
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tenns of 1)rocess. Third, for the theist, it is possible that, 
if we can f!fJ no further, we must retreat to our orij:inal pre-
suppositions, examir.c them, and possibly find that tl1e vie·w of 
all as being either being or Sartrean consciousness is inade-
quate. :F'inally, we can admit the inadequacJr of fi ttinc; any 
traditi ona 1 notion of God into a Sartrean fraraework, yet not 
reject the experience of God, and attempt to formulate a new 
language to spe.3.k of this experience which would not vio~ate 
the cru1ons of meaning for Sartre. 
God is not a Cr~~.-The traditional idea of Go:i as t.be 
creator is also put into question by S3.rtre. To speck meaning-
fully of creatfon, there must be a creaJGed thing which exists 
in dependence on the creator. This created thing must be for 
Sartre either the being-in-itself or the being-for-it self. 
Consider first being-in-itself. If it e:dsts as created 
by amther, it is either existing subjectively or obJectively. 
IIov.:ever, ":ii' being is conceived in a subjectivity, even a di-
vine subjectivity, it remains a r.1ode of intra-subjective being.n59 
But such a conception Cloe s violence to any objectivity. "Such 
a subjectivity cannot have even the rer;resentation of an ob-
jectivity, and consequently it cannot even be affected with the 
·will to create the obj ective.n 6 0 If it does not have this 
"will to create the objective," then it ccnnot be an adequate 
59rb--:a· ··, 1 · 
.... P• JCI..V. 6000. 
-
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description or what being is as it appears to us. 
Moreover, being cannot be considered as exist;,.ng objec-
tively and yet in dependence on God. 
1 
Furthermore, being, if it is suddenly placed outside the 
subjective by the fulguration of which Leibniz speaks, 
can only aff inn itself as dis tinct fron and opposed to 
its creator; other.vis:e it dissolves in him. The theory 
of perpetual creation, by rew.oving from being ·what the 
Gen11.ans call Seltst~mdigkeit, makes it disanpear in the 
divine subjectFI.rity:-:t:r be:i._r1g exists as over against GOd, 
it is its ovm support; it does not preserve the least 
trace of divine creation. In a v~rd, even if it had been 
created, being-in-itself would be ine:J..'"1Jllcabla in terms 
of creation; for it assumes its being be"yond the creation. 51 
Being-in-itself is thus either its own support and expressive of 
no dependence on God or else it is absorbed into the divine sub-
jectivity, in which case it is not being as we experience it. 
In a~ort, being-in-itself cannot be explained in tercis of a 
creator. 
Being-for-itself is also inexplicable in ter.::.us of a ere-
ator. :l!,irst, this is so because consciousrmss arises as an un-
explainable phenomenon. It surges forth from the in..;.itself as 
its pure nihilation. Sartre illustrates this in the following 
rru"l nne r o 
One may be reminded here of that convenient fiction by 
which certain popularizers are accustouecl to illustrate 
the principle of the ca.J.servation of energy. If, tJ.~ey . 
say, a single one of the atons vthich constitute the uni-
verse ·were annihilated, there 'INOUld result a cc..tastrophe 
vJ:lich vwuld extend to the entire universe, and this ·would 
be, in particular, the end of the Earth and of the solar 
61Ibid. 
40 
systen. This metaphor can be of use to us here. The 
For-Itself is like a tiny nihilation which bas its origin 
at the heart of being; and this nihilation is s~fficient 
to cause a total upheaval to haTJuen to the In-:rtself. . 
This upheaval is the world. IJ.'he FOr-itself has no reality 
save that of being the nihilation of being.62 
The for-itself, as nihilation, is an inexplicable nothingness. 
If it were to be explained in ·terms of anything, it would be 
in terms of that which it nihilates, being-in-itself, which is 
itself inexplicable. 
The deeper motivation. for this posit ion lies, I think, in 
the rela. tion~ between creation ani freedom, an issue not present 
in our consideration of the In-itself. The ~,or-itself is freedom. 
first of all because it is not a thing • 
• • • the For-itself is not the foundation of its being-as-
nothingness-of-being but it perpetually founds its own 
nothingness-of-being. Thus the for-itself is an absolute 
Unselbstllildi(:£, ·what v1e have called a non-substantial ab-
solute •••• If it would ever join with its being, then the 
otherness v1ould by the san1e stroke disap:;?ear and along 
with it possibles, knowledge, the v;orld.o3 
The li'or-i tself is t..hus not a substantial thing and cannot be 
explained in terms of the causality that could refer to things. 
Moreover, the For-itself is not only not a thing, but it 
is freedom since it is a neant. If' we were to say that this 
freedom or nothingness v;ere created b~r someone, it would then 
rob it of its freedom for Sartra. In treating Leibniz's at-
ta!l.pt to forra.ula.te a doctrine of huwan freedom, sartre contends 
62Ibid., PP• 617-18. 
63Ibid. , p. 519 • 
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that any freedom of the for-itself given after creation by 
another vmuld be relatively meaningless. / 
Thus it is true that the act comrni tted by Adam neces-
sarily derives fro11 Adarn's essence and that it thereby 
depends on Adam himself and no other, which, to be sure , 
is one condition of freedom. -But Adam's essence is for 
Adam a £!.-Y2.£; .Adan has not chosen it; he could not choose 
to be Aa:a:i:l. Consequently he does not support the respon-
sibility for his being. Hence once he hiluself has been 
given, it is of little importance that one can attribute 
to him. the relative responsibility for his acto64 
The For-itself, as e:xp ressive of hUiJlan freedom., ruust not be 
created and thus defined by an essence, but rather must surge 
up and constitute itself through its fUnda~ental choice of ends. 
This is the core of Sartro 's are;urr.e nt against God as Creator: 
the apparently irreco ncil-ia ble conflict between creation and 
freed em. 65 
Thus far we have seen that God cannot be either within or 
outside of the totality, and consequently cannot be spoken of 
as the u..rlifier of the totality. Nor crut we talk rJ.eaningfully 
64rbid., p. 458. 
65 There are, it would seem, certain alternatives to this 
dilemua. We can, first of all, distinguish bet·ween creation 
"in the beginning" (en arche) and creation ex nihilo. This 
second concept, creat~on out of nothing, is not a b f'olical 
notion but rather a scholo.stic philoso:9hical concept which 
arose as a reaction against gnostic dualisn and eventually 
crov1ded out the former concept. The concept of creation "in 
the beginning:r ·expressed. in the Old Testcu1ent Yahweh's con-
tinuing dominion over the world. In St. John it seems to 
mean "in the pattern of Christ. 11 It is the second concept, 
the idea of creation en arche, which 3artre appears to be 
fighting. It should oe noticed, hav.·ever, that the biblical 
origins of this 9.re :prior to any scholast.ic concept of crea-
tion, against which SSortre directs his attacks. 
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of God as the Creator, either in relation to the in-itself or 
the for-itself. The in-itself cannot exist as created .either 
/ 
subjectively or objectively. The for-itself cannot be seen as 
created, for it is pure nihilation, not a thing, and freedom. 
To view it as created wou.:J_d contradict these values in Sartre 's 
eyes. 
God and Cont~pzep~~.--Sartre also argues against the exis-
tence of God at a point that touches the very heart of tradi-
tional natural theology: the notion of contingency. The refer-
ence point of this arguru.ent is the idea of God as causa sui. 
To speak of a being vvhi ch founc1.s itself is to refer to some-
thing which exists at a distance from itself, nand that would 
imply a certain nihilation of the being founded as of the being 
which founds-a duality which would be unity; here we should 
fall back into the case of the for-itself."66 Yet v.·e knovJ that 
such a beiri.g, the for-itself, is contine;ent. 
In short, every effort to conceive 0f the idea of a being 
which V1t>uld be the foundation of its being results inev-
itably in forming that of a· being which contingent as 
being-in-itself, vJould be the foundation of its own noth-
ingness •. The act of causation by ·which God is causa sui 
is a nLl-J.ilating act like every recovery of the self by tihe 
self, to the sa:ne degree that tlle original relation of' 
necessity is a rett~n to self, a reflexivity. This oxig-
inal necessity in turn ap~s on the foundation of a con-
. tineent being, precisel~ that being Vlhich is in order to 
be the cause of itself. ? 
In other words, if God exists, he is contingent, since existence 
66sartre, Bein~ and Nothinr.::ness, p. 80. 6?Ib. ~ ~a..' 
-
pp. 80-81. 
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itself is contingent in Sartre's vievJ.68 Yet it should be 
noted here that it is the structure of nihilation, /which is 
the very foundation of Sartre's ontology, which dictates this 
notion of contingency. Apart fr~~ this radical idea of nihil-
ation, the argument against contingency loses its absolute 
quality. 
Ho·wever, granting this concept of' nihilation as the founda-
tion of consciousness, we can begin to see the idea of God 
against which Sartre is here fighting. It is, fundamentally, 
an idea of God as unrelated to creatures, as outside of any of 
the processes of the universe. More precisely, it would seem 
- . 
that Sartre is fighting the idea of a uni-directional relation-
ship betvveen man and God, in which man is involved with God, 
but God is unaffected by this involver:J.e.nt.69 
It would appear that the Vlhiteheadean notion of God would 
be of no s.mall relevance at this point, especially his discus-
sion of the conseQuent nature of God. 70 In speaking of God, 
Vihitehead does not wish to present hili: as an exception. 11 God 
68rJ:here is so1;:e ground to believe that Hartmann may have 
been influential in this zaatter. See Appendix II. 
69The apotheosis of this_concept is probably best found 
in the theology of Plotlnus. For a detailed study of thls, 
see Rene .Arnou' s Le Desir de Dieu dans la nhilosophie de Plotin 
(Paris: Felix .~can, 1921). -
'70Alfred North 1,·:hitehead, Process and Reality (Ne-v; York: 
Harper and .Row, 1960), pp. 525-;:i;); A.lf'red· !·ior=Gh .initehe~d, 
Science and the Modern World (New York: ~'ree J.?ress, 1967), 
pp. 173-'79. 
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is not to be treated as an exce-ption to all metaphysical prin-
ciples~ ••• He is their chief exemplification. n71 Th)ls it is 
that Whitehead will maintain that God's consequent nature is 
not complete • but awaits the .further emergence of new actual 
entities, 72 the content of which -he then absorbs. Yet God does 
not perish in any way, and this content is not subsequently 
lopt, as with other actual entities. 
Thus it may be said (concentrating on his consequent 
nature} that God is temporal in the sense that devel;.. 
o:pment occurs within his being. But God is non-tem-
poral in the sense that he never perishes. Further, 
God is non-temporal in that his primordial nature (the 
envisagement of eternal objects} is not characterized 
by process.73 
In this way we could spealc meaningfully of the cnntengency of 
C-od vdthin a 1:'1hiteheadean context. 
The immediate objection here, of course, is how valid is 
this point of view '\Vhen referring to Sartre. At first glance, 
the two would appear to be unrelated. However, Robert c. :l'hitte-
more has, in a short but provocative article, suggested that 
there fs indeed a corunon ground between 'Whitehead and Sartre, 
wherein Vfuitehead provides the metaphysical ground for Sartre's 
71~Vhi~ehead, Process a-nd Realitz, p. 521. 
72Ibid., p. 524. 
73A. H. Johnson, Ylhitehead's Theory. !Jf Realitl_(New York: 
Dover Publications, lg62), p. 64. c.:e. also Jnitehead, Process 
and. Realitx., p. 527. This passage closes on the next page lvith .· 
a series of contradictions which are actually antitheses which 
show t.'!te subtle shift in meaning in each contrast. 
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ontology. he concludes that, "if Sartre has found in 'ilb.ite-
head his metaphysical ground, it may be that in Sartre as re-
/ 
vised, Vlhitehead has discovered his episternologist.'!74 Without 
goine into the detail of Whittemore's argument, I shall concen-
trate on the phrase "as revised," which refers to the problem 
of God in Sartre. 
Vlhittemore holds that God is "impossible" in the Sartrean 
context because Sartre gives a primacy to being over freedom. 
The impossibility can be overcome only by inverting that pri-
macy and by eliminating the necessity for separating t..'h.e in-
itself and the for-itself. The result is a situation where 
"every for-itself is at once for-itself-in-itself, and God, far 
from being an impossibility, becomes \vhat Sartre throughout his 
book admits God ought to be, namely, that total value, cosmic 
for-itself-in-itself wherein each finite for-itself secures the 
ground of its being, and. man's purpose and desire finds both its 
origin and its realization.u75 The conclusion, appealing as it 
:may be, rests on the prior denial of. Sartre 's assertion that 
being is prior to freedor:1. On what basis does V1hi tte:more deny 
this? 
The fundamental assQ~ption of this denial lies in the cla~ 
that the question of the priority of being over freedaa is a 
'74Robert C. ~lhittel~lOre, n,t.i.etaphysical 1Pounclations of sar-
tre's Ontology," Tulane Studies in :::~h.ilos'2.I2h~, VIII (1959), 121. 
75Ibid. 
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metaphysical question, the answer to \'Jhich is outside the do-
main of Sartre's ontology. The presupposition of t~e priority 
of either freedom. or being must be thus ground eel in a meta-
physics, which \lliittelT~ore feels l.hitehead offers. If so, then 
the Vlhitieheadean notion of God at least offers an alternative 
metaphysically expressed which offers a unification of the in-
itself and the for-itsolf which Sartre 's syste:X!l seems to call 
for but refuse. Yet it does not rest in a notion as ens causa 
sui, for nt.he conception of God as ens causa sui, the existence 
of ·which Sartre declo.res to be impossible, ·is a conception re-
jected by Whitehead himself.u76 
Thus we can say that· S:1rtre 's objections to a concept of 
God as causa sui, his demand for contingency and relatedness, 
does not go beyond the bounds of any conception of God.· It 
can, in fact, lead to a new interpretation of God in ter1:1s of 
process philosophy which could give full value to his ob jec-
tions while adding a coherance Sartre himself has not achieved. 
God as the Unrealizable Thi~.--The final arslUaent against 
th~ existence of God to be considered -here is concerned ·with 
the idea that the pr<3SGnce of God is necessary to me for the 
presence of the Other to be. The presence of the Other, sartre 
says, is sinply given. "No witness, not even God, could es-
~.bli~ that presence; even the For-it~self can know it only 
76rbid., :9· 11a. 
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if the presence already is. n77 Vfa cannot argue to this f1·om 
the idea of creation, already rejected above, because such a 
theory would posit us as either united or absorbed in God, or 
distinct fron Him and kl1oVlable to Eim only as an object. 78 
"Under these conditions the notion of God while revealing to 
us the internal negation as the only possible connection be-
tween consc iousnesses, shows the concept's total inadequacy: 
God is neither necessary nor sufficient as a guarantee of the 
Other's presence. u?9 Thus Sartre rejects God as the ground 
for the Other's appearance to us. 
From this rejection Sartre dra"~NS out the significance or 
the figure of God in our relations with the Other. 
This effort at recovering the human totality cannot 
take place without positing the existence of a Third, 
who is in principle distinct from hunanity and in whose 
eyes hw1anity is ·wholly object. This unrealizable 
Third, is simply the object of the limiting-concept 
of otherness. He is the one who is Ta\rd in relation 
to all possible groups, the one v;ho is no case can 
~ enter into community vdth any human group, the Third 
in relation to whom no other can constitute hLnself as 
a third. This concept is the same as the b eing-who-loolcs 
at and who can never bQ looked at; that is, it is one 
with t.he idea of God. 80 
773artre, Being and f'T<?.th.ingness, p. 122. 
?8sartre here rejects the notion that v1e may be knov:able 
to God only as objects, yet maintaL'ls that this is in fact the 
only relationship possible between consciousnesses. h'hat he 
in one place describes as an apparent impossibility he in other 
places :presents as the de facto state of affairs. Yet, as rr;,en-
tioned above, it w..ay be 1n f'act true that all th:J.t v;e allm~ to 
God is the kno·nledge of us as objscts w.hen we refuse hit-r;.. 
79sartre, BeinG and Hothin~ness, p. 232. so-· ·a ~., p. 423. 
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Thus the idea of God as an absolute Third is representative 
ot the desire for union ·with the Other, just as the/ idea of 
God as causa sui is representative of the desire of bein3-for-
itself to found itself in union \Vi th the being-in-itself.· Both 
conditions represent a contradiction, one toward which we strive 
but cannot attain. 
More deeply, however, this idea of the third represents 
for Sartre a threat to his analysis of huuan reality. If he 
is the third, "in relation to whom. no other can constitute him-
self as a third," then he becomes one who not only robs me of 
myself through the look, but also the one whom I cannot act 
upon in a similar manner.· As such, this- third would capture 
my freedom vJit.hout my being able to capture his. 
This relationship has been clearly seen by E. L. Allen 
in his coneidera tion of the :pov-1er of the look of the other. 
To understand Sartre 's position here, we ~uust recall 
the significance for him of the other person's look. 
To knov.J oneself observed is to lose one's status as a 
person and to be reduced to a thing. That would par-
ticularily be the· case were there God, for his look 
would be absolutely inescapable. Before hin, the om-
niscient and omnipotent, man is without defence. He 
is driven therefore to see himself through God's eyes, 
to renounce responsibility for his ovm life o.nd accept 
the part God designed. hL"'l to play .81 . 
Thus ·within the context of Sa.rtre 's ontology, the presence of 
an absolute third is unnecessary to guarantee the presence of 
81E. J:... Allen, E:x:istenti:=.lisu from Vii thin (London: Rout-
ledge and Kagan Paul, £td., 1~56), p. V3. 
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the other, but in actuality leads for Sartre to the elimina-
tion of my freedan and responsibility. / 
Yet the necessity of Sartre's position here is not entirely 
clear. If it be adnitted· that the presence of a third is not 
necessary to guarantee the presence of the Other to .me, must 
it also be admitted that the presence of an absolute Other will 
in fact destroy my freedom and that this unrealizable Third 
must in the future also be nothing but a lliniting concept? It 
would appear that Sartre offers us here an easy equivocation 
of the threat that an absolute Other poses and the impossibility 
of its existence. Yet this will be consj_dered more closely 
below. 
StU<.marl.-This chapter has been an examination of the onto-
logical critique of God's existence found in Bein;?l_!!;nd Nothi:J.g-
ness. The ontological meaning of God, the union of being-for-
itself and being-in-itself, was revealed as contradictory and 
impossible, yet expressive of the goal tovvard which conscious-
ness moves. Given this structure, it was .then shown how it 
is impossible to see God as a unifier, for there is no possi-
bility for God to be within or outside of consciousness and 
still retain his traditional status. J!"urther, he cannot ~ 
seen as a creator of either being-in-itself or being-for-itself. 
Finally, God cannot be seen as causa sui, for this ·would imply 
a nihilation which v'lould introduce a du;::tli ty into what should 
be a unity. Nor 1s it possible to see God as an absolute 
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Third which guarantees to us the presence of the other. 
Yet the conclusiveness of Sartre's argmfients a~e open to 
further questioning. God has been presented as a contradiction, 
but contradiction is at the heart of Sartre 's notion of con-. 
sciousness. It is difficult to reject God on these grounds 
alone. Various arguments have been offered against particular 
descriptions of God: unifier, creator, causa sui, and absolute 
Third. Yet the force of each argument has been shown to be 
pointed tovmrd. the critici&a of particular ways of conceiving 
God's being toward man: the thief of meaning, the deterr.u1iner 
of essence, as unil:1terally involved vvi th man, and as the being-
. 
who-looks-at but is never looked· at. It has been indicated 
that various alternatives are available to these objections. 
The Sartrean treat~ent of a unifier is open to logical diLfi-
culties. The traditional notion of creation is not the only 
notion of creation within the Christian tradition. The notion 
of causa sui is only one VJay of conce ptualiz'ing God, and the 
Vlhiteheadean formulation offers a valid alternative to this 
foria.ula tion. Finally, the idea of the Tnird. is not necessary 
to the presence of the Other, but does not in fact rob us of 
our :freedom. It is the concept of the Tnird that will be con-
sidered in gre3.ter detail later in this thesis. 
Sartre 's critique of God's e:;cistence then is nothing more 
than that at this point. Various concepts of God are put to 
the test and judged to be inadequate and because of this 
inadequacy the experience of God itself is rejected. 
/ 
Let us now turn to a consideration of Sartre's second 
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major philoSOl)hical work, Critique de la Raison dialectique, 
to see how Sartre•s atheism will survive seventeen years of 
criticism in the contemporary world. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE S~~..RTRE.AN VIEd OF HISTORY 
The transition fror:1 Being and Noth~l!gness to the critique 
de la Raison dialectique covers seventeen years and a vast 
amount of literature. It is not the purpose of this thesis 
to recount all that happened during this period. This has 
already been done well by Wilfred De san. 82 The problem. of 
Sartre 's marxism in its many facets is also beyond our scope 
here except insofar as it relates to the ~ore specific problem 
of Sartre's atheism. Thus the question whether 3artre's marxism. 
is a rejection or an extension of his position in Being and 
Nothingness, and the problem of ·whether his marxism is a "true" 
version of J,iarx, will be considered only insofar as they bear 
on Sartre's treatnent of God. -
However, some introductory renarks ·will be necessary to 
understand how Sartre treats the problem of' God and history. 
Therefore, in this chapter, I shall consider first Sartre's 
crit-ic isms of l·.iarxi s-.::;1, which reveal to us the values he is 
82wil:Cred De san, The kar:xis:w. of Jean-P::J.ul Sartra, pp. 
1-11. 
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attempting to uphold. This will be followed by a presentation 
of what Sartre thinks that history is. Then Sartre)s idea of 
the philosophy of hi story will be pre sen ted. Finally, the 
criticisms of Levi-Strauss and others will be considered. 
Sartre 's Critic isms of }JiarxisrJ.-The criticisms that 
Sartre levels against cont~nporary Marxists reveal those values 
which he feels m.ust be upheld. !Jioreover, they show that many 
of his criticisms of Christianity can also be made of marxism. 
It raises the question that the faults he finds are indigenous 
to ~~e human character in our age rather than a specifically 
Christian character. 
The relationship be·tween. existentialism and Marxism is 
one of parasite to its source. Existentialism has become for 
Sartre, "a parasitic system that lives on the margin of know-
ledge to which it was first of all opposed and with which today 
it tries to integrate itself.u83 At first glance it would ap-
pear that the clairn.s of Bei!15 and Nothingness have been set 
aside. 
Yet the continuity is present from two viewpoints. First, 
the basic principles of Bein<S and Nothip~ness ar.e present in 
the pritique de la Raison dialectiq~e. except under different 
nam.es. Second, the changes VIhich occur between the tvJO works 
do not constitute a rejection but rather a dialectical 
83sartre, Critique de la Raison dialectique, p. 18. 
54 
transfor.ulation, the earlier position being incorporated into 
the later synthesis.84 This principle of dialecti~ develop-
ment is at the very core of the reasoning of' the Critique. 
Sartre 's first critic ism of- r<iarxism is the problem of 
the a priori. He COlil,Plains that contemporary :marxists approach 
history with pre-conceived notions.85 "Concrete or real marx-
ists ought to deepen real men and not dissolve them in a bath 
of sulphuric acid. u86 The use of the marxist framework as a· 
set of absolute norms rather than regulative structures is a 
co1umon fault of contemporary marxists which Sartre attacks. 
Belief in God, in a similar 1.n.anner, can become an absolute and 
non-falsifiable proposit:tone7 Any such a priori tends to limit 
man's freedon by fixing him with some forru of essence. In this 
way it strikes at the very heart of dialectical reason. 
84c.f., R. D. Laing and D. G. Cooper, Reason and Violence 
(London: Tavistock Publications, 1964), p. ~. 
85sartre, Critique de la Raison dialectique, p. 32. 
B6rbid., p. 37. 
87For a discussion of tl:e n:anner in v:hich such an a priori 
operates in any discussion of the problem of God, see Antony 
Flew et al., "TheolOGY and l''o..lsificc.tion," in New Zssays in 
Philo S'O;Phical Tn~olosx, ed-• .i-\ntony :b,lew and iJ.asdair .iv•acintyre 
(London: SCi: ... J?ress, _.Ltd., 1963), pp. 96-130. In this discus-
sion R. V.i.. Hare presents the idea of ttblikstt with which we 
constna tly ap preach e:x:perience. The tenor of Sartre 's cri t-
ic ism appears to be that, although we cannot get along without 
bliks of one kind or another, they are not to e:,ro unquestioned. 
In so doing, 3artre directs attention tov~ard the fullness or 
huma.n experience and the possibilities in ... l-J.arent in it but often 
. unexplored because a blil\: goes unquestioned. 
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Second, there is not present in l.larxisn an adequate struc-
ture with which to connect the person and the grou:p'. M:arxism 
''lacks a heirarchy of mediations to know the process which pro-
duces the person and his product at the interior of' a class 
and of a given society a~ a given historical LlOment. n88 one 
·of the prh1ar airG.s of the first volu.De of the Criti~ is to 
provide those mediating structures between individual, group, . 
and history without having to refer to any transcendental point 
to found them. 
Third, the Marxists tend to speak as if the totality were 
already achieved. :B'or Sartre, there is no totality, properly 
speaking, only an on-going process of t~talisation. "The to-
talisation is never finished ill~d the totality exists at best 
only under the nrune of a detotalized totality. n89 ).s we shall 
sho·w below, this position elirninates the need f'or any type of 
Grand Totalizer, f'or a trarllicendent and all-encompassing God 
who gives L"le8.ning to history. 
Fourth, the :tiarxist analyses tend to confine themselves 
to a consideration of their objects only in an economic con-
text. Ho"~aever, ·we nust open our horizons and consider objects 
in the totality of their relations. "This means· the milieu 
of our own life, v.'ith its institutions, its :w.or:mnents, its 
88sartre, Critic!ue de la Raison dialectique, p. 44. 
89Ib. , ~., p. 56. 
instruments, cultural infirrnities ••• social temporality and 
it~ hodological space, all this must also be the object of 
/ 
our study.n90 Behind all this is a dern.and fo~, "recognition 
of the role played by the personal involvement of the eval-
uating mindou91 It is the special task of existentialism, in 
Sartre's view, to bring the true roie of the individual to 
light v1i thin the context of Marxism. 
In addi t:ii..on to these differences, which Sartre brings out 
explicitly, there are tv1o unacknowledged problems betvveen 
Sartre and l.iarximu. First is that the treating of men as 
things is more than accidnetal with r.;.Larxism. Second, the 
stance of Sartre on God's impossibility is much more phil-
osophical and perhaps dogmatic in juxtaposition to Marxism's 
almost tranquil negation, as Jean-1.:-arie le Blond has shovvn. 92 
We have seen Sartre 's criticisms of 1;Iarxism. They re-
veal a nost interesting attitude lvhich can help· us to better 
understand the values Sartre seeks to preserve. Iviarxism in 
90Ibid., p. 56. 
9lv/;i..lfred Des an, The j£arxis::n of Jean-Paul Sartre, p. 52. 
_ . 
92Jean-!~·~arie le Blond, ."Ristoire et li.berte selon sar-
tre," Etudes, 306 { 1960), pp. 62-76. IJ.1he analysis of lvi. le 
Blond ~s substantiated by Ylal ter Odajnyk. He writes: 
nA lEa.r::dst at least attem.pts to give an explanation for 
his views, an explanation tha. t may be challenged.· The 
Existentialist, however, leaves no such background for 
challenge ••• u ' 
Marxism and Existentialisr:.t (I\ew York: Doubleday and Company, 
1965l' p. 30. 
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its own way is almost a religion like Christianity in that it 
offers to a large part of the world a new vvay of lifft. Sartre •s 
/ 
criticisms reveal the values he prizes above any religion: the 
absence of a priori approaches to experience, the attempt to 
offer an achieved totality to man, the high value of the per-
sonal. We shall later ask hmv Sartre himself has lived up to 
these values he has placed so high, especially in his rejection 
of God. But first let us consider Sartre's positive ideas on 
history. 
Sartre 's Conceut of Historv .-~~!an, as project, is the 
maker of history. We call the project the process in which, 
"the most rudimentary conduct determines itself at the -same 
time in relation to real. ana. present factors which condition 
it and to a certa.in object yet-to-be-realized which it tries 
to bring about.n93 The structure of the project places man 
in his situation and yet ascribes real goals, true .1n.eaning, to 
his actions, insofar as this is possible ·within Sartre's con-
text. Man !Jlay be the result of economic forces determining 
him, but he is not only the result of these forces. In this 
way the individual's value is put at the very heart of the 
making of history. 
The project is the source of hurmn creativity, for it is 
the foundation of freedom.. "Only the project as mediation 
93sartre, Critique de la Raison dialectique, p. 63. 
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between two mo.raents of objectivity can make sense out of his-
tory, i.e., out of human creativity.n94 The fundamo/ltal reality 
of history, its most basic meaning, it put in the human indi-
viduaj's action in the present moment. The movement of total-
isation is grounded in the real and yet human freedom and ere-
ati vi ty have the highest place. ·we then find the d 1-::tlectic of 
history, "in the rapport of man with nature, in the conditions 
of departure, and the relations of men with them.n95 
Yet this dialectic is discoverable by soneone who has 
lived it, not through any type of objective inquiry. "The dia-
lectic is discoverable only to an observer situated at the in-
terior., i.e., to an enquirer who lives his inquiry at the same 
time as a possible contribution to the ideology of his entire 
epoch and as,tLe particular parxis of an individual defined by 
his personal and historical adventure at the heart of a history 
which conditions him. n96 This results in the individual dis-
covering t.he dialectic as, "rational transperency insofar as 
he makes it and as absolute necessity in as ruuch as it escapes 
his action. u97 In this way Sartre skillfully weaves freedom 
and necessity together to preserve a proper place to both, just 
as in Being and Nothingness he reconciled freedom and facticity. 
94rbid., PP· 67-68. 
95Ibid., p. 68. 
96roid., p. 133. 
~?Ibid. 
-
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The totalisation ·which results from this activity, "can 
be only a singular adventure, u 98 not a universal. ,»ialectic 
is the totalizing activity upon the practico-inert, but it 
never results in an absolute totality. This practico-inert is 
akin to the in-itself of Being and Nothingness, just as the 
group is to the for-itself. It is conposed of -all that which 
is not the free activity of man as constituting h:irn.self. It 
is not only the objects upon which ruan must act to achieve his 
project, but also others insofar as they present a threat to 
the realization of this project. 
The moving force of this dialectic is scarcity, rarity, 
luck or need. This need is the fundamental condition of man 
at this time. 
Abstractly, rarity can be held as a relation of the in-
dividual to the environr.1ent. Practically and historically. 
-that is, insofar as v1e are involved in it-the environ-
ment is a practical field already constituted, vvhich refers 
to each of the collective structures ('we shall see later 
what ~his signifies) of which the most fundamental is justly 
rarity as a negative unity of the multiplicity of men (of 
~concrete multiplicity).99 _ 
Thus rarity is abstractly the relation of the individual to the 
environ.;.:nent and in the concrete it is one of the structures of 
the collective v;hich serve _as a negative unity to a particular 
group of men. 
98Ib id. , p. 140 • 
99rbid • , p. 204. 
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Translated into any particular situation, "the rarity real-
izes the passive totality of individuals of a coll~·tiVity as 
the impossibility of coexistence: the group in the nation is 
defined by its excesses;, it is necessary that it reduce itself 
-nu..r::~.e'rically in order to subsist.nlOO Thus rarity becomes the 
source of conflict at -the heart of society and the source of 
rn.an 's inhu.."J.anity to rrJS.n. "The his tori cal process is not corn.-
prehended without a permanent element of negativity, at once 
exterior and interior-to man, which is the _perpetual possibility 
in his very existence of being the one who kills the Other or 
whom the Other kills-in other words, rarity.nlOl Scarcity or 
rarity is then the source· of intelligibility for the negation 
of man in man through matter, as man finds himself stolen by 
the v.orld around him. But it is not in rarity that necessity 
is dis covered. 
Ii' rarity defines the. situation of raan, it is matter (in 
and through man) that is the uotive force in history. 
Thus the wo rlced matter, by ·the contradict ions that it 
carries in itself, becomes for and & men the fundamental 
motor of History: in it the actions of all are united 
and given a meaning, that is, they const:itute for all_ 
the unity of a com.1"'10n future. But at the same time, 
it escapes fror:1 all and shatters the cycle of repe:Cition 
because this future-always "Oro jected within the fra:..':l.e- · 
v10rk of rarity-is inhlllilan .1"02 
lOOibid., p. 205. 
lOlJbido 
_, p. 221. 
l02Ibid., p. 250. 
Thus rnatter serves as a recentacle for the action of individuals 
' .... 
and then becomes an anti-enviroru:1entl03 which stands over against 
/ 
man and demands. change of him. 
Thus mQ,tter, as worked by hum.an action, becomes the very 
e.ll.bodiment of a culture. 
It is at the same tiille the social memory ·of a collec-
tivity, its transcendent yet interior unity, the to-
tality made of a multiplicity of dispersed activities, 
the determined menace of the future, the synthetic rela-
tion of alterity that rejoins men. It is its own Idea 
and the negation of the Idea, in· all cases the enrich-
ment of all~ without it, our thoughts and acts would 
disappear.lv4 . 
Thus rr~tter embodies my action for the Other. It even makes 
rn.e another for myself through the -set menace of the fUture: 
the threat, for example, of a stockpile of atomic bombs. In 
this way, "the thing absorbs all human activity and restores 
it in materializing it.nl05 Thus man's destiny becorues deter-
mined, caught by matter and the praxis of the Other. 
Scarcity, then, defines man's r~7lation to his environment 
and matter is shovm to be the eobodim.ent of this relation -and 
-
the foundation of the dialectic. That which allows of analysis 
as necessary a prior:,i, are two forms or alienation, alteration 
and, objectification, which we shall now consider • 
. l03rrll.e term "anti-envornoment" is not Sartre 's but l\icLuhan 's. 
o.f. l~arshall lv:cLuhan, "The relation of Environment to Anti-
Environwent," The Hum.<m Dialogu.B, ed. Floyd w. Matson and AShley 
Montagu (New York: The l!'ree Press, 196?), :pp. 39-4?. · 
l04sartre, Criti~u~, p. 250. l05Ibid., p. 249. 
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The necessity that Sartre seeks here is not to be confused 
with an indubitable fact ( "un fait indubitable") OJ' with con-
straint. ( "la. o::>ntrainte") .105 Sartre uses the fonuer term when 
he refers to the fact that man makes himself dialectically in 
acting on matter .107 Necessity is possible only within the con-
text of freedom.. nNecessity is given in experience when the 
worked matter robs us of our action~ in as much as it is 
pure materiality but in as much as it is materialized praxis.nl08 
Necessity can refer only to the results of my action and can 
make sense only if I assume the res pons ibili ty of. my actions. 
If I assume the full responsibility for the operation, 
I shall discover the necessity as ineluctable. In other 
words, the elementary·experience of necessity is that 
of a retroactive power that corrodes ·my liberty from 
the final objectification back to the original decision 
and which nevertheless is born of it .109 
Thus the necessity that Sartre seeks, that Kantian condition 
of possibility, is to be found in founded in the notion of' ali-
enation. 11 The necessity for man is to knovv himself originally 
as Other whom he is not and in the dimension of alterity.nllO 
Thus necessity in found in objectification and alteration. 
106Ibid., P• 282. 
lO?r ·a 
. ~., p. 280 • 
108rbij_. J p. 283. 
109Ibid., p. 285. 
llOibid.' p. 286. 
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The rr.anner in which necessity then functions in history 
begins to emerge. Dialectic, as sho·wn above, is a ,.singUlar 
adventure of its object. There cannot be a part of it which 
belongs ·to some pre-esetablished heavenly sqheme and is imposed 
upon the singular adventu~e. "If the dialectic exists, it is 
because certain regions of the materiality are by structure 
such that they cannot not exist.nlll These are, as we have 
seen, objectification and alteration; they belong to the very 
structure of experience. In alteration one is an Other for the 
Other, while in objectification one is outside in a Thing. · · 
Both of these forms of alienation are given as necessary in 
expe rie nc e • 
The result of tb. is posit ion of the necessity in the dia-
lectic of history is to free hunan history from any meaning 
outside that ·which is created throu@l _praxis or stems from the 
e.podictic structures of alienation. 
The dialectical movem.ent is not a powerful unifying 
force that is revealed as the divine will behind His-
tory: it is fir~t of all a result. It is not the dia-
lectic that forces historic:.:tl man to live out his his-
tory across terrible contradictions, but it is men, 
such as they are, under the enpire of rarity and neces-
sity, ·who are confronted under circu;ustances that His-
tory or econOJ;lics can enuraerate but only dialectic 
rationality can render intelligible.ll2 
In this manner 3artra is able to introduce the notion of some 
111Ibid., p. 132. 
112rbid. 
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notion of necessity into history without resorting to any form 
of transcendent "guarantee 11 of this necessity. .Ali~ation be-
comes man's proper form of necessity, as inescapable as the 
very structures of consciousness.-
The for..:1al structures 1.vhich express this moveruen·t; of his-
tory in soc :ial terms can be only briefly outlined here. There 
are two dialectics: "that of the individual praxis, and that 
of the group as praxis, and the pract}.co-inert field is the 
anti-dialectic of each, that is, the practico-inert social 
field is negated by individual and group praxis, and is the 
negation of both individual action and ~l:le praxis of the group.nll3 
Sartre outlines the movement of these dialectics in the move-
ment frOill. mere seriality to .groups in fusion in great detail, 
the elucidation of which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
V1hat is inportan t here is the movement of his tory. 
The movement of 1Iisto ry itself for 3artre is concerned 
with the relation betv1een groups and collectives (seriality). 
"The influence on the group on the collective (the first cir-
cularity) and the falling back of· the group once more into 
collective (the second circularity) constitute the movement 
of History .nll4 The double circularity fron the collective to 
the group and bacl: into the collective embodies the terminal 
ll3Laing and Cooper, Reason and Violence, p. 126. 
114nesan, The Earxism of Jean-P3.ul Sartre, p. 201. 
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movement of the dialectical experience and also by the sarue 
fact the very structure of social life. All of hi spory is shown 
to be a p erpe tua.l double move.cr1ent of regrouping and petrifica-
tion .115 
The Phil:,o so E..l?-Y" of His_~2.!.Y..-He are now in a posit ion to dis-
cuss the precise meaning of the philosophy of history for &l.r-
tre. The practical understanding of this dialectical movement 
(Raison dialectique} between the collective and the group in the 
working class is-called the ·working class's "objective spirit.nllo 
This belongs to the workers and yet the bourgeois {especially 
the intellectuals} can discover the objective spirit in the 
workers and by means of if discover themselves and their class 
as well. In so doing, in offering a critique of dialectical 
reason, the intellectual begins a philosophy of history. 
Yet a philosophy of history can never be more than the 
view of a particular age. There is no global, transhistorical 
viev;. A philosophy of history must feed off the spirit of its 
age. 
Thus a philosophy remains efficacious so long as the 
praxis remains living tb.at engendered it, supports it, 
anCf is clarified by it •••• Betv1een the Seventeenth and 
the Twentieth centuries I see three periods that I would 
designate b;,r famous names of- each: there is the "mo-
mentn of Descartes and Locke, that of Kant and Hegel, 
115sartre, Critiaue de la Raison ~ialectique, p. 643. 
116Ibid., p. ?42. 
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and then that of Marx.ll? 
Marx is the philosopher of this age par excellence., A. contem-
. -/ 
porary philosophy of history must offer a critique in Marxist 
terms of the movement of dialectical reason in the \vorkers. 
Objectiops and Clarification.--Perhaps the most signifi-
cant treatment of &irtre's position in the Critique to come 
out of France is that given by Claude Levi-Strauss. His ob-
jections to Sartre's positions will be considered here because 
they shed important light on the problem of necessity and the 
autonomy of History in Sartre. 
The fundamental force of the arguraent presented by Levi-
Strauss is that Sartre's·division between analytical and.dia-
lectical reason is untenable. "Sometliues he opposes dialectical 
and analytical reason as truth and error, if not as God and tbe 
devil, ·while at other times these two kinds of reason are com-
plementary, different routes to the same truths." 118 Levi-
Strauss maintains that the former conception of the two forms 
of reason discredits scientific knowledge, •.nhile the latter 
makes the distinction superfluous. Moreover, in the for1:1er 
conception, Levi-Strauss holds, the very idea of a critique of 
dialectical reason is discredited. 
The position of Sartre C3.n and will be ex,plicated in a 
ll?Ibid., pp. 16, 17. 
ll8claude Levi-Strauss, The. Savage L~ind (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicagp Press, 1966), p. 245. 
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response to the objections of Levi-Strauss, but first it \\Ould 
be fruitful to probe deeper into the foundation for these ob-
/ 
jections. The central issue here is, I thUL~, the nature and 
function of science. 
First, Levi-Strauss assigns ~a different role to dialectical 
reason than Sartre does. :E'or him, it is an instrument of ana-
lytical reason. 
In my view dialectical reason is always constitutive: it 
is the bridge, forever extended and improved, 1Nhich am.l-
ytical reason throws out over the abyss; it is unable to 
see the further shore but it knows that it is there, even 
should it be constantly receding. The term dialectical 
reason thus covers the perpetual efforts analytical reason 
must make to refor::n itself if it aspires to account for 
language, society and thought; and the distinction between 
the tvJO forms of reason in rny view rests only on tlle tem-
porary gap separating analytical reason from the under-
standing of life.ll9 
Thus analytical reason is reason in repose, v .. hile dialectical 
reason is nothing more than analytical reason in action striving 
to transcend itself. 
Yet Sartre would seem to maintain a real tension and dif-
ference between dialectical and analytical reason, a qua.lita-
tive difference. i'lriting of the rapport of material reciprocity 
betv1een classes in their historical development, Sartre des-
cribes the rapport betv1een -dialectical and analytical reason 
in great detailo 
119Ibid., p. 245o 
We know that the only intelligibility in their rapport 
is dialectical. Analytical Reason is, from this point 
ofview, an .Q,.Ppressive pra:x:i~ existing to dissolve them 
[the classeE_/ and it has as its inevitable effe-'Ct to 
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arouse for the oppressed class the dialectic as rationality 
(on the basis of circwustnnces to be determined). The 
apparition of dialectical Reason in the working class as 
the dissolution of analytical Reason and as the determina-
tion of the bourgeois class from its function and its prac-
tice (exploitation, oppression) is induced; this is a fact 
of struggle between classes. But inversely, if the bour-
geois class clings theoretically to the analytical Reason, 
dialectical Reason reappears in it as its proper fascina-
tion throug..1. its traitors (that is, its intellectuals) and 
little by little it bec,omes conscious of itself in the 
very class that it denies. The pennanent but variable 
contradiction (tension between belief and disbelief) be-
tween these two tYPes of rationality in the bourgeois 
wants to be d ascribed for itself in a ct1ltural hisfu ry .120 
This passage speaks, I think, directly to the problem with which 
Levi-Strauss is ostensibly concerned: the interrelation between 
dialectical reason and analytical reason. We see here that 
dialectical and analytical reason are opposed, not complementary 
aspects of a single reason. I'iioreover, the priority of' dialec-
tical reason in both the workers and the bourgeois, in accord-
ance \Vi th the criterion earlier annunciated .• 
Vie have seen that dialectical Reason, when one applies it 
to tbe sciences of Nature, oarmot be "constitutive:" in 
other words, it is no more than an em.ply idea of' totalisa- _ 
tion project beyond by soae rigorous and quantative laws 
that were established by positivist Reason. But in the 
totalisat ion where we are- and that we are, that dialectical 
Reason ought to prove its superiOrity in all cases for the 
intelligence of historical f'acts: it ou~it to dTsSol ve the 
positivist and analytic inter})retation fmm the heart of 
its own totalizing activity •••• If dialectical Reason 
l20Sartre, Critiq_ue de la Raisondialectique, p. 743. 
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exists, it is necessary that it be defined as the absolute 
intelligibility of an irreducible innovation in as much as 
it is an irreclucibl·3 innovation • .L2.L 
/ 
It is on that basis that 3artre is able to declare that, "pre-
cisely the new comes into the ·world by man: that is his praxis.nl22 
To reduce dialectical Reason to a division of analytical Reason 
would be to deny a true originality to Reason, the irreducible 
novelty of a situation. 
Yet one asks, why does Levi-Strauss deny this originative 
function to dialectical Reason as its proper domain? The reason, 
-
as suggested above, lies in his conception of science. In ac-
knowledging the charge that he is a transcendental materialist, 123 
Levi-Strauss makes this explic-it. 
I am a transcendental materialist because I do not regard 
dialectical reason as some thin(£ other: .tha!l analytical reason, 
upon vvhich the absolute originality of a huw.an order Vv'Ould 
be based, but as sonething additional in analytical reason: 
the necessary condition for it to venture to undertake the 
resolution of tbe human into the non-hum.an.l24 
The final phrase of this statement is of especial interest: "the 
resolution of the hum.an into the non-human." Thus Sartre would 
hold the reverse, that the fundamental purpose Y.Jould be the 
resolution of the non-human into the hwnan. One is not sur-
prised when Levi-Strauss acknmvlec1 .. ges the charge of aesthete .125 
_l21Ib"d 
---2:_·' p. 
l23Ib"d J .• J p. 
Strauss -sy-name. 
147. l22Ibid. 
-
124. The charge is not directed against Levi-
l24Levi-Strauss, The ~'!-_Va_qe f.-~i4nd, p. 246 • 
125sartrd, Criticue de la Raison dialectique, p. 183. 
~ 'IU 
"So I accept the characterization of aesthete in so far as I 
believe the· ultimate goal ot the human sciences to be n.ot to 
/ 
constitute, but to dissolve man.nl26 Although he acknowledges 
that this must not involve the impovrishm.ent of the phenomena 
and must accept the total overturning of any preconceived _idea 
that one approaches the study with, the priority in Levi-strauss's 
framework belongs to analytical or scientific reason. 
The role .of dialectical reason is to put ·the human sciences 
in possession of a reality with ·which it alone can furnish 
trem, but the properly scientific work consists in decom-
posing and then recomposing on a different plane. With all 
due respect to. Sa.rtrian phenomenology, we can hope to find 
in it only a point of departure.l2? 
Analytical reason appears to Levi-Strauss as the fundamental 
. 
instrument of human progress. 
Perhaps a· good part of the confusion and disagreement be-
tween Sartre and Levi-Strauss lies in the notion of objectivity. 
For Levi-Strauss it v;ould appear that science is capable of 
constituting itself outside the realm of c~~on experience, a 
not · uncomr.1on presupposition. Speaking of Sartre' s analysis of 
the J!,r.ench Revolution, Levi-Strauss says, "This truth is a 
matter of context, and i:f we place outselves outside it-as a 
-
man of science is bound to do-what appeared as an experienced 
truth first becomes confused and finally disappears ·altogether. nl28 
126Levi-strauss, The Sav a&e Mind, p. 24? • 
127Ibid., p. 250. 
l28Ibid~, p. _254. Italics are rn.ine. 
~ 7J. 
This stands in direct juxtaposition to Sartre's contention that 
tre totalizing activity, ttcan be only a singular adventure, nl29 
/ 
not a universal activity outside of the dialectic. The prem.uap-
tion of this view of science, that it exists outside of a con-
text of involvement, is one that_must be proven. That it can 
be is highly dubious.l30 
The issue between Sartre and Levi-Strauss is then whether 
analytical reason can direct dialectical reason. To this Sartre 
would answer an efnphatic, •rno !" He would point to history ard 
hwuan experience itself', with its two necessary forms of aliena-
tion, as the foundation of his statements. The aff irr;:a. tive 
anSINer of Levi-Strauss v1o~ld maintain that science can prescind 
fro:r-a the dialectical structures of experience and go on to con-
stitute itself. 
The resolution of the issue, the point at vvhich one must 
opt for one of the alternatives, appears to lie in the proble:a 
of necessity. Sartre offers alienation under the forms of 
objectivication and al terity as this necessary eler;;ent, as we 
129sartre, CritiQue de la Raison dialectique, p. 140. 
l30_vuch conte::nporary ·work has bee ri done sho\•Jing that science 
does not, in fact, operate on the basis of v;hat Levi-strauss 
would call a~alytical reason. In particular, see: Thomas s. 
Kuhn, The Structure of Sci.:m ti:Li c Hevolutions (Chicago, Uni-
versity of' ChiCaf:,U .t-ress, l~64J ; r-~~ch-ael fol811yi, rrhe .::>tudy 
of' ll~an (Chica2J); University of Chicago :Fress, 1965}; .i\·:..icful.el 
Polanyi, TIThe Republic of 3ci.ence: Its Political and Economic 
Theory,n a paper delivered at Roosevelt University on Januo.ry 
11, 1962. 
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have seen above. ~e has, I think, established it, even i~ the 
face o:r the objections offered by Levi-Strauss. / 
The question that remains, ·which vdll be considered in the 
next CJ..i.apter, is what the implications of this standpoint on 
the meaning of history are :tor the problem o:r God and history. 
It is to this q,uestion that I shall now turn. 
CHAPTER V 
CRITIQUE DE LA RAISON" DI,:'\LECTIQ.~: 
GOD AND HISTORY 
In his worlc of hi story Sartre has done the same thing that 
we found in Bein~ and Not~ingness: establish a framev~rk in 
which the problem of God 1 s existence is irrelevant. There were 
difficulties with the frainev.ork in the earlier work which led 
us to conclude that Sartre had willingly dismissed the possi-
bility of God's existence· rather than conclusively disproved 
it. Re had, however, destroyed several particular notions of 
God that were apparently a threat to human freedom. or dignity. 
He shall find the same pattern in the Critique de 1a Raison 
dialectique. 
God and the Groui>,.-In the constitution of the group there 
is no idea of a right from God involved. This is not only so 
because Sartre forwa.lly denies the existence of God, but also 
because there is no particular group which possess~s any type 
of onto logically pernanent status. If it did, it would place 
ontological _limits on man's freedom that Sartre is Unt'Jilling 
to admit. Thus the limitations that the group iro.pose are de 
facto. _They do mt rest on any higher type of authority, for, 
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"every man is sovereign. nl31 Thus Sartre's stance on the le-
g:ttimacy of the state. / 
Thus, in a given society, the State is neither legitimate 
nor illegitimate: it is legitimate in the group s:i..r1ce it 
is produced in a milieu of sworn faith. But this legiti-
!11?-CY is not really such in as much as its action is exer-· 
c~sed on the collectives since the Others have sworn nothing 
either to the groups or to each other. r.5Z 
The authority structures of the state are de facto and are not 
in need of any type of divine justification. 
God and Freedom.-In addition to the removal of any onto-
logical restrictions based on the authority of the group, sartre 
holds that man must take over the freedom of God, the freedom 
to do, to create, both good and evil. This is the freedom of 
the Cartesian God. 
Descartes ascribes total creative freedom-freedom to 
invent the good and the true-to God, cJ.ong with His 
limltless pmaer. And so Sartre says that Descartes has 
ascribed to God what should properly have been ascribed 
to man. Ha~ever, Descartes should not be reproached for 
this; for his great contribution to the truth was to see 
that, whether one speaks of God or man, freedom is the 
"sole foundation of being," and that ·we. Iilt!st be aY"Jare 
of freedon in being ai·':are that we exist.l53 
Yet for Sartre, as we have shovm above, there can be no freedom 
if God exists as a lirr.it on this freedom. The meaning of freedom 
is in the creativity of C.ialectic which is solely human. There 
is no need of a God to guarantee this freedom .• 
l31Sartre, ,Critique, .P• 588. Also see Desan, The k.ar-..<:ism. 
of J"ean-Paul Sartre, pp-:-176 ff. 
132Sartre ,. Cr it ioue, p • . 609. 
133J,Iary ·Jarnqcl-;:, The Philosophy of Sartre (London: Hurch-
inson University Library, r06~j, p. I7. . 
?5 
Yet it should be noted toot here, as in the arguments of 
Beige and Noth:i.pgne s,s, Sartre 's position is negati v7: God is 
not needed to ground human freedom. That certain concepts o~ 
God would impinge on human freedom does not n:ean that no con-
cept ot God is compatible. 
God and the Grand Totalizer.-The intelligibility of' the 
historical pro cess does not dem.anc1 the existence of any form 
of Grand Totalizer as a foundation for its meaning. 
If there ought to be a Truth of History (and not some 
truth s-even organized in a system.) it is necessary that 
our experience uncover to us that type of dialectic in-
telligibility previously described as applied to the 
h1.1IJ1an adventure as a VJhole or, if one prefers, that there 
is a totalizing teT!1poralization of our practical multi-
plicity and that it i.s intelligible, although this total-
ization does not call for a grand totalizer.134 
This truth of history was in fact dsicovered in its necessary 
elements under the two forms of alienation that Sartre presented. 
It is this intelligibility that 3artre claims as the foundation 
of the mea nine of History and it needs no 5uarantee. 
Moreover, there is an implicit argument here. The totality 
is the concern of the many involved in it. Just as there can 
be no one outside of the totality in Sartre's ontology, so also 
in his viev1 of history there can be no unifier, no grand to-
talizer since there is no final totality to '1Nhich he could 
bear witness, only the on-going process. 
134sartre, CritiQue de la :rtB.ison dialectique, pp. 151-52. 
?6 
God versus l:!an .-There is a fourth, but not explicit, 
criticism of speaking of God in relation to history in· Sartre. 
Desan quotes Sartre as remarking to him, "Je ne m'occu:pe pas 
de Dieu, je m'occupe de l'horm:le!"l35 We can all agree with 
De san that Sartre has followed out this rule to the letter in 
his work on history. Perhaps this is his deepest criticism 
of the rreaning of God in human history: ignoring it. 
Vfuat Sartre has substituted for talk of God is the por-
trait of struggling man: man, aliena ted from himself and others, 
strugrj). ing to create meaning in this world of hum.an praxis. 
This struggle is founded in the two necessary forms of aliena-
tion presented in the preceding chapter. It needs no guarantee 
from without. As long as the alienation remains, it can ac-
cept no sal vat ion from outside. l£an historically is revealed 
as condemned to struggle. From this no one, no thing, can 
save him. Man battles alone, not even v1ith the consolation 
of seeing the face of his opponent. 
This is Sartre's vision of r-~n. 
135nesan, The 1::arxism of Jean-Paul Sart~, p. 31. 
PARI' II • WITH WHOM DOES JJIAJ."'{ 
DO BATTLE? 
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CHAPTER VI 
Tim NOTION OJ! THE OTHER 
The Fundamental ~uestion 
The purpose of this section of the thesis is not to 
prove Sartre wrong-for perhaps he is right. It is rather to 
attempt to formulate a personal response to the experience of 
following Sartre throug..h the battle with God, a battle that 
each of us must resolve in his own way. For Sartre recognized 
not only that it was a battle, but the wuy the battle must be 
waged. In one of his most powerful and beautiful pieces, his 
obituary for Andre Gide, Sartre says it better than I ever 
could. 
The problem of God is a hunan problem which concerns the 
rapport between men. It is a totc:.l :problem to which each 
man brings a solution by his entire life, and the solu-
tion v:hich one brings to it reflects the attitude one has 
chosen toward other r:1en and tov;~ards oneself. 1/fua t Gide 
gives us that is most precious is his decision to live 
to the finish the agony and death of God. He could vvell 
have done what others did and gamble on his concepts, 
decide for faith or atheism. at the age of twenty and hold 
to this for his entire life. Instead, he v;anted to put 
his relationship with religion to the text and the living 
dialectic ·which led hLru to his final atheism is a journey 
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which can be repeated after, but not settled by concepts 
and notions.l36 
Each of us, in his ovm way, must bring his total life to the 
problem of God. I shall try in this part to live out part of 
my own battle in relation. to Sartre 's atheis1.n.. 
One of the fundamental difficulties for Sa.rtre would seem 
to be knowing ·what to do with God. Consider first VJha t Sartre 
bad to live with. The influences outlines in Chapter One of 
this thesis clearly point to the experience of a world from which 
both ·God and real human n:..eaning had apparently fled. A highly 
technical, bourgeois, indecently optimistic ·world which im-
poses its standards upon all those too conditioned to think 
for themselves-this is vvhat the Frenchman, still caught up in 
World Vlar II, saw around him. To this is added a particularily 
French taste for nothingness. 
The result can hardly be a traditional theisn:-at least, 
a theism that in any way offers a set of answers to the human 
condition. The fundarne ntal force of Sartre·' s experience seems 
to have led him. to a view of man an both tragic and free, man 
as thrown into an absurd world, but yet capable of pulling 
himself by his ovm bootstraps. To invoke the providence of 
God to make sense out of this, to say tbat God eventually gives 
meaning to this absurd condition, is only to make it more 
136Jean-Paul Sa.rtre, "The Li vine; Gide," Situations, trans. 
Benita Eisler (New York: George Braziller, 1965), p. 66. 
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absurd, to steal away any hurJlan o.ignity left in the world. 
God, within .Sartre' s context, did not make any sen~e. Man 
was in a tragic situation, and anything that would say that 
this was not so v1as for Sartre only a form of bad faith, an 
atte.r?1pt to hide man from himself, to avoid the burden of freedom 
and forget the presence of tragedy. 
As has been shown, Sartre 's vJhole picture of man pos-
tulates that man's entire existence is a pursuit of God, that 
man himself is the desire to be God. Yet it is precisely this 
which man cannot attain, for he is forever a futile passion. 
Vlhat he must do is, "find himself and persuade himself that 
nothing can save him from himself, even a viable proof of the 
. 1~7 ex1s tence of _God • " ..., It is in this way that man must turn 
to himself, not to any false promises of a future salvation. 
Yet the ciore fundamental question begins to emerge fram 
this consideration: Is it possible to maintain a vielv of man 
as tragic and free here and now and yet not to rule out ~ 
priori the existence of God? 
In his discussion of "Doing and Havin{3,nl38 3artre points 
to a fundamental attitude whic.h is m.an.ifest in his approach to 
the problem of God. .Appropiation never fulfills my original 
l37sartre, L'~xistentialisme est un hur.'l3.Pj_s-.me, p. 95. 
l388artre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 575-600. 
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desire ·to become my own foundation. Of itself appropiation 
is a futile a ttem:pt. The result of the recognitioJa' of this 
futility· is the desire to destroy the object. "The recogni-. 
tion that it is impossible to possess an object involves ·for 
tre for-itself a violent urge to destroy it.nl39 It would 
appear that this might ·well be the attitude which Sartre has 
assumed tov1ard the problem of God. He has made him into an 
object. found that it is impossible to possess that object, 
and decided to destroy that' which he cannot possess. 
Moreover, the result of the act of destruction offers 
its ovm form of satisfaction. 
To destroy is to reabsorb into myself; it is to enter 
along with the being-in-itself of the destroyed object 
into a relation as profound as that of creation. The 
flames which burn the farrr..1 which I myself have set on 
fire, gradually effect the fusion of tl'..e farm with my-
self. In annihilating it I am changing it into ~self. 
Suddenly I rediscover the relation of being found in 
creation, but in reverse; I an the foundation of the 
barn ·which is bu1ning; I am. this barn since I am des-
troying its being. Destruction realizes the ap:;>ropia- · 
tion perhaps more keenly that creation does, for the 
object destroyed is r..o longer there to show itself im-
penetrable •••• thus to destroy is to recreate by assum.ing 
oneself as solely ·responsible for the being of what 
ex is ted for all. 14:0 
Although this passage is not written to explain the foundation 
for his attitude tov1ard the problem of God, it certainly does 
offer an interesting line of approach to Sartre's atheism, all 
139Ibid., p. 593. 
140Ibid. 
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the more revelatory because it v~e.s not consciously offered as 
a foundation. From this it would appear that Sartr~ might well 
be engaged in the task of the destruction of God. It bears 
closer exa~ination. 
The :rirst point this passage makes about destruction is 
that it is an attempt to reabsorb in to oneself' tre object of 
destruction. And so it is in Sartre 's a the ism: the denial of 
God results in r.'lan's taking over his :runctions. It is now 
man who creates meaning; it is man who nust assume the freedom 
of the Cartesian God. Since the very idea of God is a contra-
diction, man in destroying Gocl be cones the desire and anbodi-
ment of his contradiction. 
l:-oreover, just as I am this barn since I am destroying 
its beir.g, so also if God is an Other, I too become the Other 
who is God in that I am even robbing God of his being since I 
can constitu"'l.ie him 'llvith my look. I do not create God, I des-
troy him in his pov1er by constituting then denying him as the 
supreme other • 
Finally, to destroy God is to recreate him as a private 
responsibility rather than a public being. .A;t.'ter destroying 
God, I recreate him by recreating myself as the destroyer of 
his being. It is in this way that 3artre's atheis.ll becomes, 
as Susan Anima Taubes phrases it, "the religious experience 
of the death of God. 11 Even the destruction of God defille s 
me in my being. 
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Yet this leaves several questions unanffivered. This pas-
sage on destruction opens the wey for us to speak of God as that 
/ 
which Sartre atternp ts to destroy. Let us here bracket the ques-
tion of the possibility of God's existence, for I think that 
Sartre 's answer to it comes only after-and as part of-his 
attempt to destroy God. If we do so, -vve can then advance the 
hypothesis that God is the Other par excellence-a view that 
Sartre rejects during his attempt to destroy God, but an al-
ternative perhaps too hastily disposed of. 
Sartre does not want to consider God as the supreme 
Other because it would spell the end to human freedom. As we 
have shown above, Sartre holds this because such an Other would 
fix human freedom in its gaze, and it is this freedetU ·which 
must be maintained at all costs. 
Yet in fact could we not consider Cbd to be all that 
which Sartre describes him as, including the logical irn.pos-
sibility, and still profess a belief in him? If we are to 
believe his statement in L'Existentit:iLisme est un hum.anis:ne 
cited above, the fundamental point of his a theism is that man 
find himself and realize that nothing can save him from him-
self. If this is the case, then I would venture to say that 
a viev; of God as the Other would not be out of place, for in 
Sartre the Other does not prevent one fr01n. finding oneself. 
It is to the consideration of this topic that 'de shall turn 
after exau.ing the m.ode of presence of the Other. 
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The Presence of the Other 
In his concluding remarks in the chapter on ",The Exis-
tence of Others,n Sartra gives us the two forms under which 
we experience the presence of the Other. The Other's exis-
tence is, "experienced with evidence in and through the fact 
of my objectivity.ul41 The Other's existence is found in ray 
experience of m.y owt;~. objectivity and the consequent fact that 
I am alienated for the Other. I react by grasping the Other 
as an Object. 
In short, the Otber can exist for us in two forra.s: if 
I exp:;:rience him ·with evidence, I fail to know him; if 
l k:nov1 him, if I act upon him, I only reach his being-
as-object and his probable existence in the midst of 4 
the world. No synt.b.e-si s of the tvJo forms is possible •1 - 2 
Thus we have two :fundamental ways th roug,.'I-J. which v1e may come to 
the Other. In the first, I experience the Other by finding 
my own objectivity. In this case, I do hot know the Other, 
rather I have an e:t..'];>erience of his existence, the evidence of 
whieil lies in my ovm ob jecti vi ty. In the second case , ·when I 
think that I know the Other, but in fact what I know is his 
being-an-object-for me. This results.in my alienation from 
him because I do not know hin as subject, but only as object. 
His existence, that is, the existence of a particular Other, 
is given to rae only with the probability of his being-as-an-
14lsartre, Bein,z and No.th.inr.::n:ess_, p. 302. 
142!!2_id. 
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object. It is because of this second case, the Other's being-· 
an-object for me, that I can never reach the Other ~s subject. 
It is because of this that these two forms of the Other's exis-
tence cannot be united. 
Let us turn our attention a little more closely to this 
first case. 3artre uses the phrase, "with evidence." What we 
experience with evidence is not the concrete presence of a 
particular Other, but rather the ontological presence of the 
Other. 
Vlhat appears to me then about '1Nhich I can be nistaken 
is not -the Other nor the real, concrete bond betv1een 
tle Other and Ee; it is a this which can represent a 
man-as-obj ec t as r1ell as n()'t"""'fepresent"C.>ne. 'Jha t is 
only probable is the distance and the real proxihlity 
o:f the Other; that is, his character as an object and 
his belonging to the world which I cause to be revealed 
are not doubt;ful inasmuch as I make the Other appear 
by my very up surge .143 
Thus it is that I can know the Other through a real, concrete 
bond, but there is no guarantee that the particular Other that 
I kno·w as an object has any specific verifiable content given 
in obje-ctivity. 
Thus the objectivity that would at first appear to belong. 
to Sartre' s representation of the Other disappears • 
• • • t!lis ob jecti vi ty dissolves in the world as the result 
of the Other's being ttan Other so~neY~here in the ~,lorld." 
The Other-as-object is certain as· an appearance correla-
tive vdth the .recoverl. off r.:lY subjectivity, but it is 
l.d."' • 8 
-vib1d., p. 2 0. 
- . 
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never certain that the Other is that object.l44 
The only meaning in reference to the obj ecti vi ty of the Other 
/ 
can then be the structure by which the Other is present, not 
the particular con tent of any specific instance. Any certainty 
that we may clairn. about content can never really rise above 
the level of probability.l45 
In regard to the .second case, here I have evidence of 
the structure of the presence of the Other, but qgain there 
is no specifiable content which is verifiable. that is, which 
can be attributed to a subject. The proof for this condition 
lies in the look, not the fact of my :'being-looked-at, n but 
first my looking at an o~ject. 
The proof of my condition as lJJan, as an object for all 
other living men, as throvm in the arena beneath rnir:-
lions of lool:s and escaping myself Iilillions of times-
this proof I realize concretely on the occasion of the 
upsurge of an object into ny universe if this object 
indicates to rue tbat I am probably an object as present 
functioning as a differentiated this for a consciousness. 
The n roof is the ensemble of the phenomenon v;hi ch we 
call- the look.l45 . 
Thus the evidence of the Other is given to r11e in the appear-
ance of an object in my consciousness and upon that follows 
l44Ibid. 
145This matter of objectivity,inreference to both sci-
ence and marxist history, is interestingly if somevlhat incon-
clusively debated by 3artre and L .• Naville in the nniscussion 1' 
follmving L'}Jxistnetialisme est un hwaanim,J.e, esp. pp. 135-11. 
Sartre rems.Dls true there to lns vieVJS e:(i)ressed in Be 1n.s ·and_ 
Nothingnesrs and the QE_i tiQue de la R:1ison dialectique. 
146sartre, Being and Notnin,sness, p. 281. 
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the probability that this object is constituting rue as an ob-
ject. Thus the experience of the look. / 
Yet one may ask the grounds for the assertion that an 
object does indeed come into my world. The answer to thi-s 
takes us as far back in Sartre's ontological structure as it 
is possible to go: the initial upsurge of the ]'or-itself. This 
is sim.ply given. 
It is the For-itself which establishes this co-existence [Of things in the midst of the worlV by making itself 
co-present to all o But in the case of- the Presence of 
the For-itself to beins-in-itself, there cannot be a 
third term. No "'Nitness-not even God-could establish 
that presence; even the i"T?or-itself can lmow it only if 
the presence alreadl is. 47 
·Thus- it is that this presence be cones the very raode of exi s-
tance of the For-itself, the basic starting point in any def-
inition of it. " ••• originally the For-itself is presence to 
being in so far as the For-itself is to itself its own vvitness 
of co-existence.nl48 Thus the presence of the Other rests upon 
the very ontological structure of the For-itself. 
-Moreover, the presence of the Other reveals struggle, 
which presumes the tragic and free components of ~an's situa-
tion, as a fundamental mode of our being in the world. In ad-
dition to the subjective reactions of fear, pride, _shame, and 
the recognition of my slavery (alienation), I experience through 
147Ibid., p. 122. 
148Ibid. 
-
the look of the Other my own precarious situation. 
Through the Other's look I live myself as fixec} in ·the 
midst of the vJorld, as in danger, as irremediable. But 
I know neither what I am nor v.;hat is my place in the 
worra;- not what face this world in which I am. turns 
toward the Other .149 
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This living in danger is the foundation of struggle, The con-
ditions of this struggle are the freedom and absurdity of ny 
situation. This we find in the look of the Other. 150 
VIe can, then, in surnm.ary see that the Other is present 
to us through the evidence of my own being-an-object and through 
the particular instances of the Other's being-an-object for me. 
Although I cail.L'1ot unite these t·wo modes, I can see that this 
presence of the Other is -ontologically grounded in the very 
structure of the For-itself. This structure reveals itself 
to me su bj ecti vely in the experience of struggle. 
Let us now turn o'Ui.:' attention back to the problem of 
God. Can we speak of him as an Other? 
149Ibid., p. 268. 
15Q1!,or a good discussion of this, see J!,rancis Jeanson, 
Le Pro bl erne moral et la pens ee de Sa}' .1~ (Paris : Editions du 
kyrte, l9':h7) , pp. 165-6?. 
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OHAPl'ER VII 
A HYPOTHESIS: GOD AS OTHER 
We are now in a position to ask the question, "What sense 
does it make to sneak of God as the Supreme Other?" From the 
preceding investigation we can see that any such conception of 
God as Other would appear to present God as the absolute threat 
to human freedom, not only because it would do so through some 
-
fonn of Su:Preme Look, but also because or the threat presented 
by some forms or traditional religious experiences as Sartre 
analyzes them, especially Christian death, eternity and orig-
inal sin. It would apJ>ear that, if God were the Supreme Other, 
he would ontologically prohibit ru.an' s .freedom and these -tradi-
tional. Christian notions would _be an expression of this.-
But let us first suspend the ontologi<?al arguments against 
the existence of God, for these have been shown above to apply 
to a specific idea of God, not the experience of him._ We can 
then test out the hypothesis that God is the Supreme Other. 
For this discussion, we can: begin with a pertinent passage in 
Sartre 's Bei.ry,s and Nothingness where he considers the probl-em 
of establishing the nresence of God as the infinite subject 
for ·whom I exist. 
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••• if I turn away fron the look as the occasion of con-
crete proof and seek to think emDtil~ of the ·infinite 
indistinction of the hu.man presence and to uniyy it 
under the concept of the infini ta series of mystic e:c-
perienc.as of the presence of the Other, I obtain the 
notion of God as the omnipresent, infinite subject for 
whom I exist. But there two objectivations, the con:-
crete, enumerating objectivication and the unifying, 
abstract objectivation, both lack proved reality-: 
that is, the prenum.erical presence of the Other.lol 
Here Sartre himself presents presents a hypothesis: what sense 
does it make if we try to conceive God as an omnipresent, in-
finite subject? The sense, he maintains, is purely abstract 
and given only through the abstraction, not in concrete exper-
iences. 
Let the co:re of his argument is located in his idea of 
the Other. Locating it in the context of the previous analysis, · 
we can say that we can have evidence of the Other through the 
analysis of Being-for-itself follov·1ed by the inference that 
some of the objects of rn.y consciousness are sub~ects that grasp 
my owri being-an-object just as I grasp theirs·. Yet I find 
that I operate only in the realm of .probability when I at-
tenpt to make particular, contentful statements about a spe-· 
cif'ic Other. 
The step that Sartre takes in the above quotation, where 
he says that the idea o.f God as an infinite subject. contains 
two objecti vations that lack proved reality, follows logically 
l5lsartre, Being and Hothin_f1.1ess, p. 281. 
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from this treatment of the Other. The first objectivation con-
sists in thinking, "emptily of the infinite indistil}Ction of 
the human presence." In so doing, we are trying to think first 
of all of a presence t.r..a t vve can.tiot know with evidence as an 
empty content, for all that we can ever know within the frame-
work that Sartre has set up for the Other is a finite series 
of particular instances, the multiplicity of objects at which 
I look. As instances, I know them only in the concrete, not 
in infinite indistinction. 
Even if this objectivation. v;ere admitted, which it is 
not, there is still necessary a second objectivation: a unifying 
and abstract one. This is the idea of the omnipresen.t, infinite 
subject for \mom I exist, which is reached through abstractly 
unifying the series of mystic experiences of the presence or 
·the Other. Such an abstraction is not given in experience, 
that is, it does not have the "givenness" of the upsurge of 
the l!or-i tself, of the "prenULlerical presence of the Other." 
Let us stop for a m.OlJ.ent, hovvever, and examine this God 
as Other that Sartre has rejected. It is a God who is an in-
finite subject, ormipresent and unli:nited. It is this God 
who is rejected--rather than as impossible, as lacking Eroved 
reali t;y) Yet \'Jha t else could· the situation be, since in his 
analysis of the Other Sartre has shr.:.Jvm that the particular 
content of the presence of the Other can never be deternined 
vi'i th more than probability and that it can be knovm as an 
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object to me only in particular instances. :ffor Sartre, not 
only can I not know the subject· as such, but I calllJ-Ot ever . 
know the object in general but only through generalizations. 
Yet Sartre has not posed the question: If, indeed, I do 
encounter God, is it as an omnipresent, infinite subject for 
whom I exist? Is this not rather the description Vvhich one 
-
attempts to apply reflectively to an experience after the fact 
and ·with certain preconceived notions about infinity and omn.i-
presence? Is Sartre not saying here, not that one cannot have 
an ex:perience of God as the Other, but rather that this exper-
ience cannot upon reflection be proven? .iUl he has done here 
is deny the sense of trying to prove the reality of the exper-
ience of God as an Other. The attempt to prove the experience 
through the idea of an infinite and omnipresent subject is 
futile v1 ithin the context of Sartre 's idea of the existence 
of the Other, and thus the demand th..a t it be proven would 
violate the very canons of proof that s~rtre has established. 
But v1ha t of the experience itself. If we claimed. to 
experience God as the Highest Other, and wished to explicate 
this experience vdthin the 3artrean fra!!lework, \Vhat could VJe 
say about it? First, that it could not be proven. But, then, 
neither could the experience _of any other particular Other. 
This, then., ·would hardly be a valid criticism. from Sartre 's 
standpoint. 
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Second, we could cl&im. that this introduces into our rela-
tion with God the same ter.ms as our relation with m~: we turn 
God into an Other and thus an object. To this I would say first 
of all that this often appears to be the case. God, indeed, is 
frequently made into an object, for '\Ve do not have to graps him 
v 
as a subject at all. l~oi"eover, this is the only way in which 
we can experience an Other according to Sartre. Vli tness the 
manner in which Sartre has killed God and even attempted to 
bury the corpse-the objectified concept. 
Furthermore, and this will be developed below, might it 
be possible that in the experience of the other there is indeed 
some experience of the Oth.er as subject, not just as object? 
:Might one go further and say that this experience of the other 
as subject is indeed, according to Sartrean norms, lacking in 
proven reality, just as the experience of God as a subject is 
also? Could not we go another step and say that -the experiences 
or particular Others as subject and that the lack of proven 
reality present in the experience of God as subject indeed car-
ries over to the e;x:peri ence of ·the Othe_r in_ particular as sub~ 
jeot? Thus Sartre's description of our relations with the. 
Otber- is Llldeed the human 'Nay or so relating to the other, but 
there is also an unprovable, fai th-deoanding manner of relating 
to the Other \\'hich is outside the conrines of Sartre's ontology 
to handle? To the answer to this question one can, it would seem 
to me, turn only to one's own experience. 
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Third, the problem of freedom on the hwnan level arises. 
God, says Sartre, captures my freedom. 'I'he freedQl11 or' God 
kills the freedom of man. Yet ·we can see that several dif-
ficulties with this are.now beginning to emerge. 
The first is that, if we do indeed have an experience 
of God as the Highest Other, it has not in fact robbed me of 
my freedom. This is so priiL.arily because we experience God 
as an Other, even if the Highest Other, and thus I remain as 
free as I am in my relations with any other particular Other. 
I ·can still, in fact, manifest my freedom. in the face of God. 
Moreover, it is nor that I am free to do evil but, when 
I try to do good, I must· sheepi.shly follow behind the Lord, 
according to Sartre. Yet this is again not what the situation 
is in fact. Moral ambiguity still remains in any concrete 
situation, for we are not here dealine with a world of essences, 
natural law, or cententful moral imperatives. We are d~aling 
rather with situations ·t.vhere the good is not found but created 
within them. The situations are human, and so is the crea-
tivity demanded by them, as we shall see below. 
In regard to Sartre's ideas of original sin, death and 
the Christian concept of eternity in relation to human freedom, 
much or what Sartre says seems to be quite valid. As. I have: 
tried to show in the dis cuss ion of these concepts in Chapter 
II, Sartre's criticisms are playing a real part in contemporary 
Christian rethinking of these problems. 
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·As we have seen, then, the manner in which Sartre' s idea 
of the Other is structured opens for us a new way 9t speaking 
about the encounter with God, of man's way of being-toward-God 
that Sartre did not forsee. Let us approach this new alterna-
tive in more detail, exploring the rJ.eaning of our view of God 
as the Other in relation to the Sartrean criticisms of theism. 
Sartrean Objections to God as the Other.--To have found 
one ·way in which the encounter v;i th God TJ.ay be expressed mean-
ingfully is one thing. Yet two tasks remain before us. First, 
the theoretical structure n:.ust be defended within the Sartrean 
context, if we are to remain within the cannons of intellig-
ibility chosen at the be·cinning of this thesis. Second, ·we 
must point to a concrete exaBple of this experience. Then 
we can say not only is it possible that God is encountered in 
this manner, but here indeed is an exaraple. This second task 
will be the proper subject of the following chapter. It is 
to the first q_ue stion that I shall direct my rem.arks for the 
remainder of this chapter. 
First, the hypothesis of the encounter vJith God as the 
Other is presented to account for a particular field of human 
experience Vlhich is meaningful •. The explanation of experi-
ence iS the basic task of phenonenology. This point, the 
basic task of '9henomenology, is well put by Francis Jcanson, 
a disciple of Sartre. 
Pheno.:a.enology is a method o1' sub_jectication fi:suojec-
tivation"7• !t is its way {pe~1aps the only conceivable 
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one) to re~qin objective with regard to huraan phen-
omena, in refusing -Eo submit them arbitrarily to the 
absolute domination of some theorl-which woulj always 
be, itself, only a human phenmn.enon among others. vihen 
one addresses man, it is proper to allow him as least 
the power to reply • .l52 
In testing this hypothesis of God as the Other, it is first 
of all to this refusal to submit huo.an phenomena to the ab-
solute dominion of an atheistic theory that I appeal. Let 
us see at least what the phenonenon tells us. 
It is for this reason that the interpretation of :ll'ianser 
on Sartre's atheism must ultimately be put aside. lie holds 
that, "too much emphasis has been placed on Sartre's atheisLl.nl53 
Although he recognizes that Sartre has said much on the topic, 
Manser would seen to want to disregard it. 
No doubt in his public state1nents about the subject he 
has assuned a polemical attitude •• ·~ .I am concerned with 
his philosophy primarily, and I think it is clear that 
on the view of consciousness that he is putting for.vard 
it does not make sense to talk of a Being \'iho has the 
set of attributes which are usually attributed to God 
within the Christ ian w or 1 do 154 
l.lr. Eanser's comnendabl.e aim, to be primarily concerned with 
Sartre 's philosophy, is somev~ha t vitiated by his concrete 
application. .A.s should be obvious by the length of' this paper, 
Sartre has said much about God. To imply that this is in 
152:ifrancis Jeanson, Le Phenomen?logie (Paris: Editions 
Tequi, 1951), p. 113. 
l53.A.nthony Kanser, Sartre: A Philosophic Stud.z (Neill York: 
Oxford University Press, l967), p. 70. 
154Ibid. 
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general outside the realm of philosophy is somewhat- presump-
tuous. / 
The only philosophic content Manser seem.s to recognize 
in Sartre's atheism is Sartre's att_empt to prove that God is 
impossible. Sartre attempts to see, n·what God's existence 
would be like. nl55 In so doing, "Sartre finds Him impossible 
because inconceivable, though this does not prevent him fron 
seeing the notion is one which naturally haunts mankind. nl56 
In effect, l!1anser is saying that Sartre has rejected a par-
ticular notion of God ("a Being who has the set of attributes 
which are usually attributed to God ~~thin the Christian 
world") on the grounds that it is inconceivable, and that this 
is all there is to it. By restricting himself to Sartre's 
philosophy primarily, 1'.'Ianser glides over the question of the 
truth of Sartre's atheism, apparently not _a question to be 
considered in a philosophic study. 
Such an attitude toward the problem does not, -it would 
see.m, deserve the title of ph~losophy. The concern of phen-
omenology, as evident from Jeanson's _state~ent above, is the 
human phenomenon. The dimensions of the problem of atheism. 
for Sartre are quite obvious- in the statement on Gide quoted 
at the beginning of this chapter. Within the Sartrean context, 
l55~. 
155Ibid., p. 71. 
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one both can and should consider the human experience as fun-
damental. It is on this basis that the hypothesiS/ of God as 
the Other must be tested. 
At this point vve can thexi say that a certain concept of 
God has been rejected by Sartre, a concept of God as repre--
sentative of the union of being-for-itself and being-in-itself. 
It has been suggested that there is a validity' to these cri-
ticimas, but that this is not the only concept of God, and 
indeed it is possible that we experience God as the Other, 
even though it may be God as the union of the in-itself and 
the for-itself that we desire. It has been argued that it is 
the role of phenoBenology to attend to the truth of exper-
ience and further investigate the experience of God as Other. 
In this regard, Francis Jeanson again has some fruitful 
suruestions. Aclmowledgins that not even the religious choice 
dispenses man from a moral choice, and suggeoting that the 
moral choice has often been left to the theologian, Jeanson 
says that even belief is- alvvays a free choice, the choice of 
an ideal. 
Such is the profound truth hidden behind the scien-
tistic £iscientistes2 excesses of the sociologists-
VThen they are preoccupied in demonstrating the non-
existence of God by the anthropological character of 
its notion: the God of each man is the God that he 
has chosen to serve.l57 
157Jeanson, Le ?robleme moral et la penoee de Sartre, 
p. 331. 
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The encounter ·with God as the Other would appear to me to be 
intimately related to this ncition that the God of/each man 
represents his ideal. God is encountered in experience not 
as th~ union of the for-itself and the in-itself, but rather 
as the .. highest challenge, as the highest Other who demands 
most fully my creative response. Two notions follow irfilll.ed-
iately from this: the moral value of God and the necessity 
of faith. 
Jeanson brings out this first consequence clearly. 
After advancing the proposition that all value is a valor-
ization, he applies this to the problem of God. 
The perfect is entr~sted to us only in refusing it, 
its only existence for us is that of a being to real-
ize. In the idea of the perfect, there is not the 
evidence of a Being, but.the experience of avoca-
tion. naoa exists,n is an impossible proposition 
as a proposition. It would even be so as a theore-
bical sunposition. It has value only under the form 
of an active position and of a practical valoriza-
tion.l58 · 
Thus ·we see the structure of the problem of God emerge more 
clearly: it is not one of pro:posi tions or theoretical sup-
positions, but rather one of the active position one takes 
in regard to the choice of the ideal one wants to serve. 
Yet the question of verification iranedia tely arises. 
How do I know that such a choice is right. Such assurance 
is not given as an ansv;er, ·but is found in self-questioning 
158Ibid., p. 333. 
-
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that is never-ending. 
But the choice that I will have made, how do I assure 
myself of its value if I no more interrogate ti(yself on 
its profound significance-if I refuse to let myself 
put it in question, if I accept blindly the risk or 
having chosen, under the pretext of' an ardent faith,_ 
some abandon.'TI.ent, some renouncement, some anticipated 
appropiation of my salvation, some imraediate justifica~ 
tion for no longer discovering myself to be unjusti:t'ied'?l59 
Within this context, we can say that ra.an encounters God as 
the Other, not once and fal all, but within the fraraev~ork of· 
experience that continually demands self-questioning. Belief 
is not a release from struggle. 
Ue can turn back to the epigraphs v;i th which this paper 
begru1. }ill.zantzakis asks the question: With ·whom do we do 
battle'? He rei>lies, "the fierce summit of man's soul, the 
summit which vve are ceaselessly about to attain ani which 
ceaselessly jUDlps to its feet and cli1u.bs still hig..l-ler. ,160 
This is indeed the description of the God whom v1e have been 
attempting to describe here. He is the series of ideal that 
man choses for himself, ·which call hiru forth to cli:ab still 
higher. This is the ideal which, at its hig..1.est, -calls forth 
love. 
One may say that this viev; leaves us ultimately vifi th 
perhaps nothing more than an anthropormorphic con cep:t. Yet 
upon cleser exnmination, I think that the above discussion 
l59rbid., P. 332. 
160Kazantzakis, Renort to Greco, p. 4?8. 
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reveals that, although inmany respects the concept is anthro-
pormorphic, it is perhaps more than that. The el}Zll.Lent o:r 
doubt, however, demands that one does not settle into an un-
examined complacency, but rather constnatly go out to do battle 
with God. The verification is -in the -orocess itself; not in 
any theoretical proposition. This process isa living', growing 
faith, the struggle of constantly renewed encounters, not a 
static assent to a proposition. 
The significance of the second epigraph, Sartre 's dec-
laration on existentialism and atheism, become-s qlearer. The 
proo:r for the existence of God is not what is iruportan.t, rather 
it is the confrontation ·Of man with himself that is o;f the 
first concern. Yet in the idea of God as Other, it is pre- . 
cisely this role which ·we find that God plays. He calls upon 
roan to find himself and create himself--yet always in situa-
tion, in process. The call of God does not inhibit man's 
:freedom, for the task of creative action still rests ·with 
him, as does the gro·wth of the ideal. 
Even God. in his absence emerges as significant vdthin 
this· con text. The very discovery of the absence of God puts 
·into question nan's ideal, make~ him question hlinself ever 
more, invites him to purify his own ideals through creative 
action. Iv::an emerges with all the freedom and tragedy that 
Sartre feels he must have. · _Ul ·the uncertainty md moral 
ambiguity remain for the Christian, for his struggle is as 
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real as that of the a theist. Mere over, his experience-the 
experience of the theist in the contemporary worl<}<-cni.erges 
as a real step in man's consciousness of hi:uself. To ·t;his 
we shall return in the final chapter. 
Yet there remains one question to be answered. Can we 
find a concrete exam.ple of the treat1nent of God as a Supreme 
Other that would admit any specifications that Sartre could 
establish? It is to this that we now turn our attention. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE WORDS: GOD AS THE REFUSED OIJ.l£ER 
Until this point, the argwuent has concentrated on 
showing that ·within the Sartrean framevJOrk, it is possible 
to say that God may be considered as the Other. This has 
been sho·wn through the analysis of Sartre 's statements on 
the Other as well as :on God. Admitting that there are struc-
tures vJi thin Sartre 's fraY?!ework ·which allow for this hypothesis 
of God as the Other, the question now oust be raised: Can this 
actually be shown to be the case for Sartre? For the answer 
to this, I shall turn to a consideration of The Uords. 
We find here, in Sartre's autobiography, an account of 
his rejection of God. Although it is a re.jection acconplished 
by an eleven year old boy, the account of it is given by a 
nature Dan who has lived out this rejection for fifty years. 
\'Jhat we are considering, then, is not just the action of an 
eleven year old boy. Rather, it is the reflection of a sixty 
year old man making sense out of the origins of his atheism. 
Spea.l{ing of his initial rejection of God, Sartre re-
lates hoY~ a composition on the Passion was given only a silver 
medal at the Dibildos Institute and the subsequent great 
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disappointment drove him to impiety. 
God had disappeared. 
Privately, his belief in 
/ 
But privately, I ceased to associate with Hin. Only once 
did I have the feeling that He existed. I had been playing 
with matches and burned a small rug. I was in the p~ocess 
of covering up my crime when suddenly God saw me.. I felt' 
His gaze inside my head and on my hands. I whirled about 
in the bathroom, horribly visible, a live target. Indig-
nation saved me. I flew into a rage against so. crude an 
indiscretion. I blasphemed, I muttered like my grand-
father: "God damn it, God damn it, God damn it." He 
never looked at me again.l6L 
'There are several uaportant points that can. be drawn from this 
passage. 
First, the confrontation with God as Other clearly emer-
ges. lie is the one that sees Sartre in his guilt, in his· at-
. 
fort to cover up. Moreover, his gaze s-eems not so much to 
rob Sartre of his freedom., for his freedom. is manifest in his 
rejection of God, as to put him in an indiscrete confrontation 
with himself. 
Second, the confrontation is shocki~3ly personal. It 
is not the meeting between an abstract concept and absolute 
freedom, but rather a personal, particular meeting in rela-
tion to a specific action of Sartre. God was not encountered 
as the union of the for-itself and the in-itself. He was 
present as an Other within a particular situation. 
Third, there is an apparent desire to destroy the Other 
161Jean-Paul Sartre, The Words,· trans. Bernard l!,rechtman 
(New York: George Braziller, 1964), p. 102. 
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which results from this encountered. It is again the kind of 
reaction that it not directed toward an abstract cloncept, but 
to·ward a concrete encounter with an Other. 
Fourth, there is the question of whether the rejection 
was made in bad faith. A good case could be made for the fact 
that it was in bad faith, for there is apparently a rejection 
of one's own actions here. Sartre was faced with not just the 
fact that God vms looking at him, but that he was revealing 
his situation to hL~. It makes Sartre visible to huuself, 
"horribly visible, a live targat." It did not drive him to 
further self questioning, but to rage, a form of bad faith. 
He may have been rejecting self-knmvledge at this point, as 
well as God. 
Fifth, and last, the question of truth is not really 
raised. God could have really been there, but Sartre does 
not choose to recogniz-e this presence, to press it further. 
Rather he flies into a rage. 
_ Thus it ·would appear from this passage, one of the few 
autobiographical statenents on the origins or his atheism, 
that Sartre not only encountered God as an Other, but that 
he also rejected him as such. The task of his later life, 
thelong atheism that followed, was to make sense of this 
rejection, and to destroy that Other that he had rejected 
so early in his life. 
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The net result of this encounter is the break-up of a 
romance that might have been. It is in this way tkat Sartre 
surllillari zes it. 
I have just related the story of a missed vocation: 
I needed God, He was given to me, I received Him without 
realizing that I was seeking Him. Failing to take root 
in my heart, He vegitated in me for a while, then He 
died. Whenever anyone speaks to me about Him today, 
I say, with the easy arausement of an old beau who meets 
a forr.1er belle: "Fifty years ago, had it not been for 
that misunderstanding, that mistake, the accident that 
separated us, there might have been something between 
us.l62 
Thus it would appear that this "misunderstanding" took root, 
and after tbat there was little that Sartre could do, despite 
the freedom he attributes to the individual. 
The closing pages of rrhe Vlordsl63 give us a final view 
of the bemused atheist. They are almost impossible to quote 
from, for they have an elusive quality. The effect lies in 
the totality, not in any single component. Yet they are too 
long to quote here. I can only draw out a central theme. 
Sartre admits that he has changed, mainly through the 
discovery of his own ugliness and his a9prenticeship to vio-
lence. He no longer ;;aily demonstrdtes that man is irapossible 
and that he is the apostle to the absurd. "For the last ten 
years or so I've been a man who's been wa.\::ing up, cured of a 
162Ibid., pp. 102-03. 
l65rbid. ' pp. 248-55. 
-
10? 
long, bitter-mveet ma,dness, and who can't get over the fact, 
a man who can't think of his old ways without laughing and who 
doesn't know what to do with himselt.nl64 This awakening has 
brought about a change in his atheism frou the militant -stand 
of Being and Nothil:l_gn~s~ through the hiarxism of the Critique 
de la Raison dialectique to the bemused attitude of The ·rrords. 
·where it 'Ni~l go from here is yet to be seen. 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTUS 
Loolcing back upon what has been done, I can see that it 
is both a ·work in itself and a prospectus for future inves-
tigation. In this final chapter I should like to state 
. briefly what has been done and '\vhat I feel remains • 
. CONCLUSION 
The argument that has been put forth in this thesis 
is that there is roon ·v1i thin the Sa.rtrean frameworl.:: for a 
particular approach to God. It has been developed as follows. 
First, the histo·rical factors that influenced Sartre's 
way of looking at the world VJere investigated. It was seen 
that_ they demand a view of God that ·would not rob .man of his 
freedom and dignity and yet would not deny the real disorder 
and absurdity of the contemporary ·world. The values of freedom 
and tragedy ·were found to be at the core of Sartre 's vision. 
After eXplicating the ontological structures that formed 
the foundation of Sartre's ontology, a detailed consideration 
was given to his ontological arguments against the existence 
of God and his criticisms of traditional relgious experiences. 
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In regard to the forruer, it was shown that Sartre 's disproof 
applied to a particular notion of God, but did not direct it-
/ 
self to the problem of the experience of God. As to the latter, 
it was shown that mny of Sartre' s criticisms of traditional 
religious experiences carried much meaning and that they are 
in fact an important part of contemporary Christian discus-
sions of the meaning of these experiences, even if these dis-
cussions draw the same ideas from. other sources such as psy-
choanalysis, the history of religions, cultural anthropology, 
etc. 
Then Sartre' s vie-ws on history were examined closely. 
It became apparent that fie was here defending the same values 
found in his earlier work, especially man's freedom and tragic 
situation expressed through tl1e concept of alienation. 
The problem of God and History ·within the Sartrean con-
text was investigated, with the result that vJe founi Sartre 
more interested in man than the problem. of God. The meaning 
that is found in history was only that created by man. Jmy 
necessity inherent in its structures was only the necessity 
of alterity and objectification. There ·was no apparent need 
. for God as a Grand Totalizer or source of authority within 
this fra...11evmrk. 
In the second :part .of this thesis, the question of the 
meaning of God as Other vvas raised. "'\fter exposing the gen-
eral notion of the Other in Sartre 's fra"TT.eworx, the notion 
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of God as the Other was advanced as a hypothesis. It ·was then 
established that there are no theoreticQl difficu~ies in this 
hypothesis vli thin the framework that Sartre 's ontology allows. 
At that point it was possible to say that God could be en-
countered as the Other. It still had not been ~stablished 
that God had been encountered in such a way and that this en-
counter would be admissable to Sartre. 
The autobiographical remarks on his encounter with God 
in 'rhe Words gave us the final link in the arguruent. Here 
Sartre relates his enccunter with God, and his description 
is of en encounter with an Other. It is this Ot~er that Sartre 
then rejects and attempt.s to destroy in his anger. That this 
might well be an act. of bad faith was presented. 
I conclude, then, that there is roon for speakiDB mean-
ingfully of an encounter with God ·within the Sartrean frame-
work. It not only does not violate the canons -of intellig-
ibility that Sartre has established, but it offers new direc-
tions to us in speaking about the :problem of God. 
FUTUBE DffiECTIONS 
There are difficulties in talkins about God ·within this 
context. The security of a pre-established notion o~ God is 
removed. The meaning of his existence is put into question. 
These are difficu.l ties and dan£:,-ers that are not to be lightly 
dismissed. 
Y3t these difficulties can only be ·weighed opposite 
another set of problems. These other dii'ficulties/can be 
su.mmed up under the headill.g of the contemporary unbeliefo 
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The traditional concepts, whatever the reason, do not appear 
to be doing the job. The question to be considered. carefully 
is not whether they are vJrong, but whether they are the most 
adequate expressions possible. The ansv1er to this lies in 
the fut u.re • 
The more fundamental probleril vli th adm.itting many of the 
objections that Sartre raises to fundruuental religious exper-
iences is the question '\Jhether· he may not indeed be right. 
The accusation that religion often serves as a form of bad 
faith, alloi.'ving raan to avoid controntation with hi.L1self, is 
not to be taken lightly. Yet· it is to be remembered that 
atheism can allow the same phenomenon. 
To speak of God in terns of encounter, in terms of the 
way in which he actually enters our lives, demands nany radical 
changes in our ·way of thinking. The attempts of De·wart and 
Novclc and many others have been steps in this direction. Yet 
the '\vork may hardly have begun. 
The direction to be follmved is difficult to determine. 
Yet I think that a fruitful approach may lie in the notion of 
God found in "/ihitehead. Some remarks have been made above to 
indicate my reasons for this. Let it suffice to say here that 
the way appears to be open. Only the years '\'Jill tell what it 
... 
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holds. 
Finally, I would .like to say that I think th~t struggle 
lies very close to the cor_e of human meaning. Yet it is not 
just sometb,ing that philosophy talks about after the fact. 
It is something in which philosophy itself is engaged. It 
is in advancing the struggle that the value of philosophy 
lies. It is m!.r hope that this thesis has contributed in some 
small degree to that advancement which is our common concern. 
/ 
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